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THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT OF GERMANY

BY W. FRIEDMANN

IN attempting to solve the problem of Germany at Moscow, the Foreign Ministers cannot but reflect with grave hearts on the results of the first two years of Allied Military Government in Germany. The success or failure of that gigantic experiment cannot be measured by cheap comparisons or phrases, such as: "Think what the Germans would have done" or: "They have asked for it". These phrases tripped easily from the tongues of those, both inside and outside Military Government, who wanted to find a ready excuse for their own indifference or unwillingness to face the facts. The only proper measure is the task set to the Allies when they entered defeated Germany, as masters over the fate of a big and highly developed country, more absolute than any victors have ever been.

The task was a two-fold one; first, the joint government of Germany as an essential step towards Allied integration and super-national government; secondly, the conversion of Germany into a peacefully-minded, reasonably contented but not menacing country. The accomplishment of these tasks demanded a width of outlook, a clarity of purpose, an art of government and administration and a spirit of devotion without comparison. Total control meant total responsibility. The Germans could not and, to a large extent cannot even now, do much more than offer the body of the patient on whom a new kind of operation is to be performed. But after a brief narcosis the patient regained consciousness and watched the operation with feelings mixed of pain, curiosity and an increasingly cynical scepticism of the skill of the doctors. Here indeed we have the first turning of the tables. In their very misery and agony, the Germans know that the four Allies depend on the success or failure of their German administration no less desperately than they themselves. They have linked their own mutual relations, their prestige and, to a large extent, the peace of the world with it.

None of the foreign ministers can be under any illusion that the balance sheet of the first two years is a bad one, both for the Allied nations jointly and for each of them separately in regard to the administration of its special zone. Politically, the aim of joint Allied control of a German administration, with zonal sub-divisions, has been turned into the practical division of Germany into four countries, halfway between states and colonies, (the economic union between the British and American zones has now restored a partial union between these two zones). Nor has any of the four nations succeeded in gain-

ing the lasting respect and sympathies of the Germans in their zones.

They have failed for different reasons. The Russians, who came in with the immense prestige value of their military victories and of a political and social system which seemed the great antithesis of Naziism, have failed mainly owing to three factors: the understandable but deplorable total collapse of discipline, especially during the first six months, the indiscriminate but often contradictory character of their economic policy, the mixture of industrial reconstruction and destruction due far more than is generally believed to conflicting Russian policies; and finally the realization by the Germans that the Soviet attitude towards individual liberty was fundamentally akin to that of the Nazis. The French, bent as before mainly on the incorporation of their zone of occupation into the French orbit, have failed again in their attempt to persuade Germans of the blessings of being Frenchmen. They have, on the whole, the easiest zone to administer: the zone least destroyed and most thinly populated, with the rich Saar territory in it. Their failure is mainly due to the indiscipline of their troops and the openly professed objective of getting as much as possible out of their zone, regardless of the consequences. Economically, both the Russians and the French have undoubtedly got something out of their zones. The net benefit of the thousands of machines and factories dismantled and transported to Russia and France respectively is sadly out of proportion to the damage suffered by German industry. The very manner of dismantling made many machines useless from the start, and the transport in conditions of chaos, often took many months, spoiling a large proportion of the machines which did not get lost on the way. Much more substantial is the benefit from current production of such German industry as remains.

Britain and the United States have failed for different reasons. Having suffered less immediate damage at the hands of the Germans, they did not set themselves the primary objective of getting out of their zones what they could. The amount of open reparations—except for certain items such as merchant shipping—is very small in relation to the burden of keeping the zones free. One qualification is needed: hidden reparations, in the form of patents, trademarks and, above all, thousands of special machines taken away for the use more often than not, of specific industrial competitors, are substantial and should be accounted for as an item of reparations. In many cases, it is true, the effect has only been to make a particular patent or trade secret hitherto known only to one firm in this country available to all. Again, the negative effect has been greater than the positive. Many hundreds of German firms feel that the result of the work of generations has been taken away from them, often by disguised competitors under thin official pretence, and this psychological effect far outweighs the material benefit. But the British and American failure is mainly a political one. They have both failed, though for different reasons, to impress Germans with the superior value of Western democracy. (The French have laid more emphasis on their cultural and

istic superiority; but exhibitions of modern French paintings have not entirely made up for empty stomachs). The Americans have done their best, and not altogether without success, to introduce their conception of democratic institutions. But no one can pretend that their occupation forces have lived up to the ideals of a superior civilization. Before a special currency was introduced for occupation troops, the amount of money sent home by the American occupation forces, in one month, was three times the total pay owed to them. Generosity, indiscipline and rapaciousness are strangely mingled. But the greatest difficulty is the mental gulf between the average American and the European problem.

For the first year of occupation the British alone seemed to have won the genuine respect of the Germans. They were, on the whole, reserved but humane and seemed essentially intent on keeping the rudiments of life going and restoring them. There was little corruption. The last year has brought a radical change: this is due to four factors. For two of them the British have only limited responsibility. First, in the zone which has by far the biggest concentration of ruined towns and destroyed industries, the influx of nearly two million old people, women and children from the east has been disastrous. But the British Government could not help this, once it had given its fateful assent to the *de facto* frontier with Poland running along the Oder-Neisse line. Secondly, the British made a psychological mistake in doing everything, during the first year of occupation, to keep industry going on the substantial accumulated stocks of raw materials, while starting to apply the dismantling policy and closing down of industries in the second year when the physical and mental reserves of the Germans were exhausted and their readiness to accept such measures was far smaller. The Russians and French here have a psychological advantage in having been ruthless at the very beginning. There is however thirdly, an undoubted deterioration in the British personnel, both civil and military. This is hardly so at the top level; but the trained military government officer and the disciplined veteran soldier have been replaced by a mass of second and third-rate business men, and by young troops whose first period of active service means barrack discipline in duty hours and absolute power off duty. Lastly, initiative and improvisation have been replaced by an incredibly complex bureaucratic system handled by a conglomeration of people inferior in quality and integrity to the trained Civil Service at home.

A balanced account of the situation after two years of military government must however weigh the factors outside the immediate control of the four Allied governments against those within their control. The Germans are only too apt to forget that even the wisest and most efficient Allied administration would have been faced with the inescapable consequences of nearly six years' war. The physical destruction alone would have meant many years of ceaseless reconstruction in a world of plenty. And while the destruction

of the towns is largely the result of Allied bombing, the transport chaos is mainly the result of the insane and criminal policy of the Nazi leaders in the last few weeks of the war, the senseless destruction of almost every bridge, the blocking of waterways, etc. Again, the desperate shortage of raw materials and food in Germany is only a more intensive aspect of the world shortage of coal and food (especially fats) which is hitting the rest of the world, with a few fortunate exceptions.

Unfortunately, this factor, which is largely a German moral responsibility and compels Britain, for example, to provide food for Germany out of her meagre resources of foreign exchange, is so mixed up with factors for which the Allied governments are themselves responsible that it is doubly difficult to remind hungry and weary Germans of their own responsibilities. Two facts overshadow all others, both in their economic and political consequences, and in their psychological effect upon the Germans: the mass expulsion of Germans from Eastern Germany and Czechoslovakia, and the disintegration of Germany into four zones which symbolize Allied disunity.

The futility of justifying these mass expulsions by comparison with German actions has already been stressed. Economically, the expulsions from the East mean that the richest grain producing area in Central Europe is to-day largely a wilderness, while the people who cultivated it are an unwanted addition to the overcrowded West, mainly to the British zone. Hundreds can witness the desolation of the East which the Poles are unable to fill with adequate numbers of settlers. Of the three million Sudeten Germans, the Czechs have expelled about two-thirds, realizing at last that they were not equally guilty, and, above all, that many of them were among the most skilled craftsmen, engineers and farmers. But the practice, recently adopted, of retaining the skilled men, while continuing to expel their families, is not much superior to the practice of the Nazis. Even a fusion of the four zones of Germany could not to-day produce anything approaching self sufficiency in food, because the bulk of Eastern Germany is outside.

Psychologically, it is impossible to exaggerate the effect of the mass expulsions on the Germans.* There, to the minds of both idealists and cynics, is a living and ever-present vindication of the Nazi theory that victory means only a turning of the tables and that the worst thing is not to make war but to be beaten. Britain may have been hard pressed when assenting to this calamitous decision on the *de facto* Polish frontier but she must share with the other Allies the responsibility for a decision the disastrous effects of which are incalculable and can hardly be mitigated now.

The disintegration of Germany into four zones again has an economic and political, as well as a psychological aspect. Economically, it has meant, until recently, and it still means to a large extent that the paralysed economic life of Germany circulates within areas which are not only too small but utterly

* cf. the warnings in "Multi-National States" in THE FORTNIGHTLY, May 1944.

balanced. The British zone, with its concentration of heavy industry and dense population, is heavily under-productive in food; but its industries, such as coal mining, textiles and engineering, formerly received much of their specialized equipment from Saxony and Berlin. The machinery of administration, already immensely complicated through the double hierarchy of Allied and German administration has been made even more difficult by internal problems. Moreover the zones are essentially the result of the accidents of military occupation and of horse dealing rather than of any plan. The worst example is the frontier between the American and French zone. Two of the oldest, most liberal and best balanced states of Germany, Württemberg and Baden, with a population of three million and one and a half million respectively, have been cut into half. Their capitals, Stuttgart and Karlsruhe, lie at the very southern end of the American zone. Through the hardening of zone boundaries the northern and southern halves of these two states have been drawn more and more apart, against all political economic and psychological reason. Even the attempt to remedy the worst consequences through an exchange, by incorporation of the whole of one of the states in the American and of the other in the French zone, has failed. A better way of both suffocating a sound regional and federal system, and of reviving national mythologies, can hardly be imagined.

Worse however, is the general psychological effect of the division. Every German constantly sees before him the four different systems set up by the Allies and their thinly disguised conflicts. There is, it is true, an Allied Control Authority in Berlin. It has passed a small number of orders, between thirty or forty laws, and a similar number of directives. But with the exception of a directive on de-Nazification (even this is far from uniformly interpreted in the different zones), of taxation, and of the establishment of certain machinery for labour relations,* these joint measures are concerned with relative trifles, such as the confiscation of Nazi literature, the establishment of a uniform time throughout Germany, the demilitarization of sport, etc. Essentially, the four zones have become four different worlds in which the Allies exhibit their different conceptions of government, of humanitarianism, of social progress, etc. Strangely enough, it is the British, with all their record and experience in indirect government, who have been more governess-like than any of the other powers and have exhibited a zeal for the introduction of speculative reforms which has increased the gulf between the zones.

* Some of these decisions were made after many months of discussion; others were reached with astonishing levity. Thus, a Control Council Law of May 10, 1946, fixed the tax of cigars—which, in Germany, are the small man's smoke—at ninety per cent of the retail price. This meant a tenfold increase of the price and led to the immediate paralysis of the cigar industry largely concentrated in the British zone and employing some 30,000 people. The decision was made without consultation of the Trade and Industries Divisions concerned. After months of protest and both British and German endeavours, the British Authorities reduced the tax to eighty per cent. Defering the rest, and the industry—a typical craftsman's and smallholder's industry of the type to be encouraged—was restarted.

The most important British measure in this field is the reform of local government which has replaced the traditional German system of full time administrators (Landrat in rural areas, and Burgomaster in towns), responsible, before the advent of the Nazis, to rural and municipal parliaments, by the English system of full time unpolitical town clerks and honorary, politically elected mayors. This system, by no means unquestionable in this country, has meant, in Germany, a duplication of machinery and cost, at a time when there is a desperate shortage of capable administrators and there are hardly any people with the means and leisure to fill the honorary posts. Invariably either the honorary mayor, who is the nominal chief and has the superior title (a matter of outstanding importance to Germans) or, more frequently, the permanent official runs the show. The immediate result of this well meant but misguided reform, the objects of which could have been accomplished by a shortening of the terms of office of the permanent officials, has been the flight of some of the most capable administrators to the American zone which, in this respect, has been handled with much more discretion. The Russians have of course interfered even more fundamentally with the German system, but they have done it indirectly, through the sponsoring of a German party which they presume will carry out Soviet policy.

The economic effect of the recent economic fusion between the British and American zones—which has been described in a recent article in *The Times* (March 4) should not be exaggerated; it has created almost as many problems as it has solved. The fusion smacks of a western state which the British and American governments are rightly anxious to avoid as long as there is any prospect of a re-establishment of a central German administration. Consequently, the fusion is limited to certain functions: industry and trade, agriculture and transport. The zones remain separate politically and, to an uncertain extent, socially. The bi-zonal administration are directly responsible only to military government and, indirectly, to the constituent states of the two zones which creates a dangerous tension between the needs of central planning and particularist tendencies. The social conceptions of the two Allied governments, especially on the question of public ownership of industries, differ considerably. Yet, this fusion is the first big step forward, in so far as it partially heals at least one of the zonal divisions and restores freedom of movement and communication between them. How far the split has gone in the less than two years of occupation is shown by the fact that the bi-zonal administration for food and agriculture has so far had the greatest difficulty in inducing the southern states to throw their relatively greater resources in food into the common pool.

The next factor of disorder, which is squarely an Allied responsibility, is the confusion of economic policy. The Russians have vacillated between a policy of utter spoliation of their zone and a partial economic reconstruction, the latter policy being advocated by the Russian military government, the

former by Moscow. The French have gone for downright exploitation of their zone, and this may alter only in the case of the Saar which they now consider to all intents and purposes as French. The Americans have executed the most radical turnabout, from the insane Morgenthau plan of complete de-industrialization (including the closing down of coal mines) to the Byrnes policy of restoring the German economy to reasonable prosperity. The British have, in principle, pursued a policy of moderate reconstruction from the beginning but have been far too weak and inconsistent in carrying it out. During the past twelve months, the British have, for instance, sacrificed their own much more sensible construction of zonal authorities for very questionable American constructions of confederate government. The basic fallacy lies however in the principle of the Level of Industry Plan. It is not the actual level of production determined in the Plan which has so far caused the greatest trouble. Steel capacity for example, is left at seven and a half million tons of which more than three-quarters is in the British zone; but the zone cannot produce at present more than three million tons. It is the principle which is wrong. It involves the control of German industry almost factory by factory, by an inflated staff of controllers and is therefore as difficult to execute in practice as its philosophy is wrong. The alternative is the efficient control of certain keys of production, such as power generation and the import of certain raw materials, coupled with a system of inspection through a very much smaller staff of highly skilled inspectors.

The other dilemma created by Allied policy is the burden which it casts upon the Allies, especially the British and American governments, because of the German inability to produce and export. Here again, the bi-zonal fusion marks the beginning of good sense; the German import and export agency, under the control of an Anglo-American agency, has been instructed to work out an export and import programme, enabling the two western zones gradually to pay their way. It means an initial further investment of Allied resources, through the import of raw materials. But this is much more realistic and sane than the previous policy.

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A second article by Dr. Friedmann, in the May issue of THE FORTNIGHTLY, will discuss the main problems now to be solved.

MAN-POWER AND STRATEGY

BY W. T. WELLS, M.P.

"THE prospective labour force of 18,300,000 men and women at December 1947," states the much-discussed White Paper "Economic Survey for 1947",* "falls substantially short of what is needed to reach the national objectives." To help to fill this gap the Government is appealing to women to enter industry and is planning for the absorption, within the current year, of 100,000 foreign workers, to raise the total to 18,400,000. It seems clear that this latter figure is still materially short of what is required; before the American loan runs out, our exports must be raised to at least seventy-five per cent more than the 1938 volume, whereas this year the target aimed at is not more than forty per cent. increase on that figure. If the higher figure is to be achieved during 1948, either more workers will have to be found, or fewer will have to be engaged in production for home consumption, or more workers will have to be employed in production and fewer in distribution and similar services. The effect of adopting the second of these courses would be to lower the standard of living, while the effect of the third, even if it be practicable, is at present incalculable.

In this connection the White Paper published shortly before the Economic Survey, "Statement Relating to Defence",† gives rise to, and has occasioned, serious reflection if not actual misgiving. This Paper shows that, on December 31, 1946, the strength of the Armed Forces was 1,427,000 and the numbers employed in producing for the Services was 459,000; by March 31, 1948, it is estimated that the numbers of men and women in the Forces will have fallen to 1,087,000, whilst during the year 1947-48 the numbers engaged in production for the Services will be in the neighbourhood of 450,000. In other words, at a time of national impoverishment and man-power shortage between 1,900,000 and 1,500,000 men and women, instead of being engaged in productive work, will be, from the purely economic standpoint, merely consumers, paid from the results of the surplus productive capacity of the rest of the population. Is this a burden that the country can, at this time, bear?

It is certainly ironical to reflect that we are having to support forces of this size out of a labour shortage when, before the war, we were finding it difficult to recruit the Services at about a third of the present strength with over a million unemployed. Our international position is untenable without economic recov-

* Comd. 7045.

† Cmd. 7042.

ary and we maintain armed forces solely in order to maintain our international position. The question is, are our armed forces going to undermine our chances of economic recovery?

The countervailing factors to be considered are succinctly stated in the "Statement Relating to Defence" (paragraph 7): "... developments in recent months have stressed the urgent need of restoring a balanced peace economy at the earliest moment, and by all practicable measures . . . But it is essential that the fruits of seven years of intense war effort should not be thrown away by an ill-considered jettisoning of defence responsibilities, however admirable may be the aim of lightening the national burden. Two major wars in one generation have pointed the force of this conclusion . . ."

Indeed they have, and to demand a reduction in our armed forces below what is necessary for national security would be the height of irresponsibility. But national security does not involve some static and clearly ascertainable requirement of man-power and material; it varies from time to time both with the international situation and with technical developments. It is a problem that calls for constant and almost continuous investigation. What are the demands of national security to-day? Are the plans now being proposed made on a realistic basis? These are the questions that this article sets out to examine.

The short-term problem is that discussed within the compass of the "Statement Relating to Defence". This contemplates, as stated above, the reduction in the numbers of the armed forces by 340,000 in the fifteen months from December 31, 1946 to March 31, 1947, that is to say a monthly rate of just under 23,000. The numbers, in fact, are being reduced by approximately one-third. On the face of it, this is a very rapid and even drastic reduction; but the period after the end of a great war is naturally the time for such a reduction, and it is right to ask whether the process cannot be hastened. The present rate represents a reduction in strength of less than two per cent. a month. While the forces have to be kept in being at all it is imperative to keep them efficient, and clearly there is a rate beyond which the units of any of the Services cannot be deprived of their most experienced and best-trained men without having their efficiency impaired. In this connection it must be remembered that since June 1945, 4,290,000 men and women have been demobilized, so that, inevitably, the quality of the forces cannot be now what it was then. At the same time, this rate of two per cent. represents less than the percentage of its nominal strength which any unit would normally have expected to have had absent on privilege leave during the war years. If, therefore, the maintenance of efficiency be the governing consideration that determines the present rate of release, some further explanation seems required why this proportion has been selected.

It may well be, however, that this has not been the governing consideration. If it has not been, what has? The only apparent answer is that our existing commitments govern the rate of release. If this answer is correct, the immediate question to arise is, what prospect is there of such a drastic restriction of our

commitments as to justify a fall of 340,000 in the numbers of men and women in the Services; or, to take the Army alone, on which necessarily falls the main burden of our operational commitments at the present time, a reduction of over 300,000, from 896,000 in February 1947 to 590,000 in March 1948? What reductions in our commitments are likely within the relevant period?

By March of next year our troops will have left Italy and Venezia Giulia. It is to be hoped that the Austrian treaty will by then have been signed and that the period of three months, within which our troops will have left, will have expired; and it is probable that the remnant of our forces will have left Greece. The process by which our Army is to withdraw from India should by then be well in train, and there may be some reduction in the forces stationed in the Middle East, exclusive of Palestine. Even making the somewhat wide assumption that either the reference of the Palestine problem to the United Nations Organization is so successful that a substantial reduction of our garrison there can be made, or that the failure, and the insolubility of the whole problem, will be so apparent that the Government will decide on an unqualified withdrawal, it seems doubtful whether the forces stationed there can be materially reduced within the space of twelve months. It is hard to see from where else any material reductions, on operational grounds, can come.

If the limiting factor be the maintenance of efficiency, the rate of reduction seems rather over-cautious and too slow; if it be the discharge of existing commitments and the diminution or disappearance of these within the coming year, the assumptions governing the decision would appear to be rather over-optimistic. It may be that there is some other factor, but it is hard to see what it could be. Perhaps it has been decided to compromise between the two principles enunciated in the "Statement Relating to Defence"—the early restoration of a balanced peace economy and the avoidance of "an ill-considered jettisoning of defence responsibilities"—by taking some risks in the removal of units from theatres where they have operational responsibilities, whilst playing for safety in the quality of units by resisting their rapid dilution by men whose training has not been completed.

This short-term problem is important, but it is secondary to the problem of the strength contemplated for our forces in the post-demobilization period. How many of our human and material resources are they going to drain off in the intensely critical years that lie beyond, in 1949, 1950, and 1951? It is in one or other of those years that the American loan will run out and the real problem of the maintenance of our standard of living will become apparent. It is in one of those years, if the problems of fuel shortage and lack of generating plant are first overcome, that the shortage of our man-power for the productive tasks of the future will become manifest.

It is easy to say that we must cut our coat according to our cloth, but unfortunately the problems involved are too complex, and too many of the factors are imponderable, for any man to be able to tell what our cloth will be. A

weak defence policy is bad for our credit and consequently causes a shrinkage of the cloth that is available. Conversely, strength is respected and trade tends to follow the flag. But such strength must be genuine and well-founded, and an attempt to cover up intrinsic weakness by an ambitious defence policy would soon be exposed and would aggravate the disaster that it sought to avert. The "Statement Relating to Defence" has placed the problem in perspective and it is clear that we must cut non-productive expenditure to the minimum. What are the essential objectives of our strategy and how can they most economically be achieved?

This White Paper on Defence states that the meeting of three long-term commitments is "fundamental to our ability to fulfil our declared intention to support the object of the United Nations, which is to establish a stable system for the maintenance of peace." These three commitments are:

- (i) The Security of the United Kingdom.
- (ii) The Safeguarding of Communications.
- (iii) The Contribution to Forces of the United Nations Organization.

The statement of these essential objectives is unexceptionable, but it is difficult to translate them into the language of immediate tasks to be performed. From what, and indeed whom, is the United Kingdom to be secure? Is the primary danger sea-borne invasion, air-borne invasion, aerial bombing (with or without the atom bomb), destruction by long-range weapons (again with or without the use of nuclear fission), or bacteriological warfare? The adding of new dangers does not mean that the old cease to exist; it is good to note that in paragraph 21 of the "Statement Relating to Defence" the Government gives pride of place to "concentration on research" among the four principles to be followed in considering the supply of equipment to the forces, but research is of fundamental importance in fields other than the supply of equipment. The guiding principles in safeguarding the security of the United Kingdom should be to have a sufficient nucleus for expansion to meet the traditional dangers as and when the international situation becomes such as to make them proximate risks, to have a strong research organization to prepare the forces for these new problems, and a positive approach to defence questions that leads men to think not only in terms of dangers to be met, if the worst should happen, but also of opportunities to be exploited.

It is as evident that we cannot skimp on safeguarding our communications as that we cannot skimp on securing the United Kingdom. But precisely what communications is it essential to us, under modern conditions, to safeguard, and how are we to set about safeguarding them? The latter question involves many technicalities, including what is now the almost venerable controversy about the rôle and the usefulness of the battleship. It is obvious that we have to do our best to safeguard the ocean routes and that the rôle of aircraft is nearly, if not quite, as important for this purpose as that of the warship.

One question of broad principle does, however, emerge from the history of

the war and the controversies of the peace. Is there any object in our remaining a Mediterranean Power? Or, to put the question in a more realistic form, is there any object of sufficient importance to justify the expenditure, of man-power and money, that our position as such involves?

It goes without saying that it is, to put it at its lowest, a very great convenience to be able to move transports and convoys freely through the Mediterranean in time of war. In the last war we were deprived of this convenience from the time of Italy's entry into the war until the summer of 1943; and we survived. It is true that the routeing of ships round the Cape and of aircraft across Central Africa was slow, cumbersome, and expensive; but our maintenance in the Mediterranean is expensive, too. It would be intolerably so were we merely guarding in peace positions that would become untenable in war. It is always difficult to avoid the nebulous in discussing broad strategical problems, but it is somewhat difficult to see how, in operations in the Mediterranean in the future, we could keep our communications open against a first-class Power with a full range of modern weapons, or how any other kind of Power could threaten them.

On the other hand, what should we gain by departing from our traditional policy of maintaining the Mediterranean as a line of sea communication? Apart from the conclusion of a treaty with Egypt, it would enable us to evacuate the Suez Canal Zone; it would remove all motives of international power from our occupation of Palestine; it would make it possible for us, if we wished, to evacuate Malta and Cyprus, though it would not necessarily follow from the fact of our abandoning the Mediterranean as a line of communication that we had found untenable in war that we must, in future altogether withdraw from that sea. With a friendly Italy Malta is tenable without being expensive, and to retain it is a comparatively cheap method of keeping our influence in the Western Mediterranean. Thus it is not necessary for us to lose our position and our influence in Western Europe simply because we withdraw from our costly commitments in the Eastern Mediterranean; and to abandon those commitments would make so material a reduction both in the size of our forces and in the volume of exports necessary to maintain them as to constitute, at once, a major economy of the character that the situation demands.

Is there any other mode of making a comparable saving as an alternative, or in addition to that to be expected from withdrawing from the Eastern Mediterranean? Apart from the withdrawal from India, it is hard to find one. The Dominions and Colonies proved themselves in the last war, as in 1914-1918, invaluable reservoirs of trained and devoted man-power. The Dominions have defence problems of their own, local in character, perhaps, but not necessarily lacking in magnitude. Australia's position in the Pacific, Canada's relationship with the United States, both limit the scale of their permanent contributions to Imperial Defence whilst at the same time the international position in which they find themselves restricts the possibility of their contract-

ing liabilities irrespective of their regional commitments. It is true that a more utterly ruthless colonial policy than any British Government has ever pursued with regard to the Crown Colonies would admit of a substantial recruitment of natives for peacetime service outside their own colonies, and of a consequent easement of our own man-power problems, but such a policy would be repulsive to our consciences and to our whole conception of inter-Imperial relationships, would prejudice the success of our policy of developing and modernizing the colonies, and would, in short, be full of political as well as moral, and perhaps military, dangers.

To withdraw from the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean seems the only means by which, once our troops have left India, our forces can materially be reduced. To adopt such a policy would involve some dangers. It is probably true that while one half of the world welcomes a British withdrawal as a mark of British sincerity, the other half deplors it as evidence of British weakness. It is equally true that if the third purpose for which the Services exist is to make a contribution to UNO, broadly speaking the larger the forces are, the greater the contribution can be; and it may be that the stronger our forces are, the sooner the Security Council and the Military Staff Committee can become effective authorities for the policing of the world. And the question of reducing the size of our forces in order to bring our commitments into line with our resources should not become too closely associated with the kindred, but essentially different, problem, of the size, character, and location of our forces in disturbed areas pending the post-war settlement. It may be good or bad policy, for example, to maintain British troops in Greece; the Government evidently consider it good policy, and if they are right it would be folly to prejudice the settlement of an Allied country and the conclusion of a sound peace for the sake of the comparatively small forces involved.

Whatever the nature of the transitional problem, the essential consideration remains, that no strategy can be sound which is not proportioned to our resources. The present level of man-power in our forces cannot be maintained for an indefinite period, yet short of a realignment of our strategy it is difficult to see what conditions would justify a substantial reduction from the figure of 1,087,000 aimed at for March 1948. This realignment, on this footing, is necessary, yet where is it to take place save in the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean? Whilst other alternatives must be explored, the argument for the change in our traditional strategy here suggested seems difficult to answer. That it has certain disadvantages is merely a way of emphasizing that our whole future as a prosperous country and a world Power is bound up with the success of the United Nations Organization, and the diminution and fairer sharing of military burdens that would flow from it.

STATE CONTROL BY A STATE BANK

BY M. A. G. HARTHOORN

NOT only has the second world war destroyed on a large scale the more durable capital goods in the form of factories, machinery, docks, roads, etc., which had been produced by the people during many years of toil, and prevented new goods from being added, but, because the production was chiefly directed towards the manufacture of such means of destruction as are needed in warfare, the production of the goods required for immediate consumption, such as foodstuffs and clothing, remained far behind requirements and resulted in a dire shortage. Man is now faced with the task of restoring what has been destroyed and of making good the shortage of articles of consumption as soon as possible. What is the best way of attaining this object? Naturally, we shall have to work hard, harder than formerly. But for labour to be performed there must be raw materials. The acquirement of the latter is conditioned by the availability of money.

It may be considered common knowledge that money is created by banks, notably the credit banks, which are institutions whose principal activities are the granting and raising of short-term credit. Those banks which deal in long-term credit, such as savings banks, mortgage banks, insurance companies, investment trusts, finance companies, agricultural credit banks and the like, do not come in question here.

Money, apart from the relatively small amount of coin in circulation, may be defined as a directly withdrawable credit with a bank, which is to be repaid by that bank on demand in legal tender money. This is possible only for the credit banks, as they alone are able to set off liquid assets against these withdrawals in the form of cash, bills of exchange, bills of lading, dock warrants, staple articles, current debentures and shares of ready marketability, which can, if necessary, immediately be converted into money through sale or borrowing. This is not possible for the other above mentioned banks, as they raise credits for a longer period, on which they allow a certain interest, which credits they invest in less liquid means yielding a higher interest. They therefore need not be prepared to meet immediate claims for withdrawal of balances. Any one who wants to be able to withdraw his money on demand, opens a current account against which he can draw at will with a credit bank, either by paying the amount involved or by pledging bills of exchange, dock warrants or securities. And anyone who wants to put out his money at interest, pays it into a savings bank, mortgage bank, investment trust or insurance company.

Another characteristic difference between credit banks and investment banks, a difference which is bound up with their dissimilar spheres of action is the fact that by granting credit which appears as a balance on a current account, the credit banks create money, since they call into existence directly withdrawable credits to their debit, which investment banks do not do, as the latter only accept money already in circulation and pass it on to others.

Banknotes, too, are directly withdrawable credits with a credit bank, notably the bank of issue. They originate from the granting of credit by the issue bank just as current account entries are passed to the debit of the credit banks in general. The only difference is that banknotes are legal tender, which current account balances are not. But in practice this difference is negligible, particularly when the issue bank, as is the case at present, is not obliged to pay banknotes offered to it in gold. That there is virtually no difference also follows from the fact that a current account balance is not considered to have a lower value than banknotes. They render equally good services in mutual payments, banknotes more particularly in the payment of small amounts, current account balances for large sums.

Apart from the comparatively small and therefore negligible quantity of coin, the volume of money in circulation in a country consists of the total amount of banknotes in circulation and the aggregate current account balances at the various credit banks. This quantity is by no means fixed, money being continually added and withdrawn. For, just as a credit bank creates new money by granting credits, which increases the existing quantity, every repayment to the bank annihilates money and causes a proportional reduction in the quantity of money. It is, therefore, only possible to speak of the average quantity of money which is in circulation during a certain period of time, say, a year. This money circulates, that is, passes on from one to another, more quickly or slowly, according as mutual payments take place briskly or otherwise. Given the average speed of circulation, we can calculate the annual turnover of goods based on the average amount of money available.

As against pre-war years, which showed a steady, though relatively slight annual increase in the volume of money, the latter increased greatly and was even multiplied, during the mid-war years. As to England, data from *The Economist* show that, while in 1928 the average amount of money in the form of banknotes and current account balances was around £2,300 million, this quantity annually increasing by a few per cent. until the war, so that in 1939 it had risen to £2,800 million, it has now risen to as much as around £6,300 million, that is, two and a quarter times the amount for 1939. And considering the turnovers effected only by payments through the Bankers' Clearing House, that is, among the banks themselves (payments between customers of the same bank, as well as the payments effected by means of banknotes and coins do not come into question here) we see that the turnovers shortly before the war amounted to around £38,000 million annually and those for 1945

£69,000 million. The money circulating in Holland in the form of bank credits, to be estimated at upwards of two and a half milliard guilders in April 1940, increased to approximately eleven milliard during the occupation of 1940-1945. Although, due to the financial re-organization, the total volume of money was reduced considerably by withdrawing part of it from circulation, it is still a multiple of the pre-war level, approximately five and a half milliard. The increase in the money circulation was accompanied by a rise in the national debt from approximately six and a half milliard to twenty-five milliard. It is chiefly on the security of this government stock that the credit banks have granted credits, by adding fresh money to circulation. For the Government was faced with an enormous expenditure, which could not be covered by the means accruing to it.

As against this enormous increase in money there is a quantity of goods materially reduced in part by destruction, in part through a production that has considerably fallen into arrears. Small wonder that the prices of these goods rose to a marked extent. They reflect the fact that the Dutch guilder has lost much of its value.

The first question that arises is: are we to attempt to raise this reduced value? Or would it be easier, in our reconstruction work, to put up with the present depreciated value of the guilder? It should be borne in mind that a public debt of Du. fl. twenty-five milliard counts more heavily when a pre-war value is assigned to the guilder than when it is based on the present guilder value. In the former case this debt would weigh most heavily on our economy, while, in the case of a depreciation to a quarter of the pre-war value, it would not be a heavier burden than a debt of six and a quarter milliards under former circumstances, if at least the conditions had remained unchanged. But this is not the case, since we have suffered great capital losses, resulting in a considerable decrease in productive capacity. As a consequence, a debt of twenty-five milliards, even if based on a guilder that has undergone a depreciation to twenty-five per cent., is at present a much heavier burden than a debt of six and a quarter milliards previously would have been. Taking into account, moreover, that this debt has by far the greater part been incurred in war time, when the guilder had already been considerably depreciated, it will no doubt be for the benefit of the Dutch people if the value of the money—it is fluctuating at the moment—is fixed at a much lower than the pre-war level.

Labour is an essential to reconstruction and prosperity in general, and the performance of labour is dependent on machinery and raw materials, for the acquirement of which money must be available. If there is money to make a start with, the Dutch people, who are quite willing to work if reasonable profits are to be expected, will set to work, thereby increasing the country's prosperity. The money to be spent for this purpose is furnished either by private persons, who take it from circulation, in which case the existing quantity

If money is not increased, or is created by the credit banks, in which case this quantity does undergo a corresponding increase. As the credit banks, by creation of money, are capable of meeting money requirements to an unlimited degree, there need be no lack of funds. The only question is, how far they may go in this respect without jeopardizing the stability of the monetary value. The latter must be maintained as far as possible in order that sound economic conditions may be ensured. If the creation of money serves unproductive purposes, such as in times of war, when labour is not directed to the production of goods that are useful to man, but to goods intended for destruction—when the increase in money is therefore not offset by an adequate increase of useful commodities—then the only result conceivable is depreciation of money, manifesting in a general increase in prices. If, however, the creation of money serves productive purposes, the addition of new money to the active circulation being counterbalanced by an increase in the quantity of goods, then the monetary value will not be adversely affected, and no increase in prices will ensue. Our slogan will therefore have to be: money should be made freely available for productive purposes.

In this connection it is of paramount importance who has to decide whether money shall be made available at all for particular purposes, and how much. This question was formerly settled by the credit banks on their own responsibility, and they were guided not only or even primarily by national interests, but, like other privately-owned bodies, by personal interests, even if these ran counter to the public good. They by no means restricted themselves to granting credits to customers in their own country, but they also sought outlets abroad, even if the prevailing conditions were unfavourable. Incited by competition, or too readily responding to the profitable prospects held out, they granted credits to undertakings at home and abroad, which in the long run proved to be unable to hold their own, or to foreign countries which failed to meet their financial obligations, as a result of which milliards were lost. And just as they granted credits abroad, they also raised credits from abroad, which were sometimes to the advantage, sometimes to the disadvantage of the native country. It is clear that this granting and raising of credits exercises a direct influence on the value of our circulating medium, our money, that is, our national currency. Enormous interests are at stake, the gravest responsibility for the weal and woe of our country and people is therefore entrusted to private bodies. For, on the maintenance of the value of our national currency depends nothing less than our national credit, since our national credit is reflected in this value.

This view was held long ago. The credit banks were subjected to government control, a state-planned economy was contemplated. But would not it be a much simpler plan to attain this object by abolishing the private credit banks and letting them merge into one single State bank? Such a condition would present considerable advantages. If the Government wants to direct the

country's economy, it cannot do this more effectively than by taking the credit policy into its own hands. Owing to the far-reaching consequences for both country and people, the Government should not even partially leave the responsibility involved to private persons, but should bear this burden itself. It has to decide whether credit is to be granted, and how much, to particular concerns and under what conditions; it alone decides whether credit is to be granted or raised abroad, and how much. By means of its credit policy it will be in a position to maintain the stability of the national currency value with respect to that of other countries.

If such a State bank is established, it is advisable to make the provision that the directly withdrawable credits with this bank, and these alone, are legal tender. The existing distinction between banknotes as legal tender and current account balances with credit banks, which are not legal tender, may safely be dropped. Only the credit of the State bank is money, is legal tender.

The obvious result of such a provision will be that current account customers of the existing credit banks will withdraw their balances from these banks and entrust them to the State bank. If credits are withdrawn by the public from the credit banks in question, their assets will have to be sacrificed for this purpose and these banks will therefore have to discontinue their activities.

In this connection it is important that as a rule payments should as far as possible be made through the State bank. To this end everyone who possesses funds of his own should open an account with this bank, where his receipts are credited and his payments are debited to him. The majority of payments can take place through the usual transfer system. In respect of payments to persons who want to have immediate certainty that the transfers will indeed be effected in their behalf, use might be made of forms previously stamped by the bank, showing the amounts requested by the applicant and in settlement of which a corresponding part of his credit balance is reserved by the bank. Banknotes and coins, now used to make small payments, may then disappear from circulation altogether. The use of this method will give a true picture not only of the existing quantity of money, as indicated by the total amount of current account balances held by the bank, but also of the turnover effected with it during a certain period of time.

It should be borne in mind that money derives its existence from the granting of credit by the bank, and remains in circulation, by passing from one to another, until it is finally paid back to the bank by the one who raised his credit there, thus disappearing from circulation. It follows therefore that the bank is capable of continually putting fresh money into circulation, more and more quickly according as the credits are granted on shorter terms and are therefore paid back sooner. In order that the bank may be able to grant new credits as often as possible, and therefore to issue new money without the active circulation being increased permanently, it will have to refrain from granting long term credits, as this would keep the credits locked up for too long

periods. It would be bad policy if the bank were to finance deficits on the national budget by lending the Government money to cover them, as this money would long continue to weigh heavily on the circulation. These deficits must be financed with money which is already in circulation, to be provided by persons or institutions that place their savings at the disposal of the State. This, for that matter, applies to all granting of long-term credits, even if they are to be used for productive investments which, however, do not bear fruit until after long periods of time, such as the establishment of new industries. The money required for this purpose must also be attracted from private persons out of the active circulation. If private enterprise should fall behind in this respect, it would be desirable for the Government, if necessary, itself to found an industrial bank, which, in the same way as a mortgage bank, borrows money from the public for long periods, which is subsequently used for making long-term loans to particular industries. Nevertheless the State bank can of course mediate in ensuring success for such long-term investments by accepting the shares and debentures in question as a security for loans. The mere capacity continually to lend money on a large scale to persons or institutions that need it for short periods enables the bank to exercise a powerful influence on the entire economic life of the people. If it were at the same time provided that imports and exports may not take place without its consent, and that foreign exchange required for this purpose or obtained thereby shall be paid from or deposited in a fund controlled by the bank, just as this ought to be a rule to be prescribed with regard to all purchase or sale of foreign exchange, then indeed will its influence on the entire economic system be so great that each concern, however large its capital may be, is subject to its power. It is the State which, by means of its bank, through its various control boards, directs economics and plans what will and what will not be produced.

If the entire settlement of financial affairs is concentrated in one bank, the state bank as sketched above, it is unnecessary, even undesirable, for undertakings to be nationalized, as is widely advocated. For is not their control the object of their nationalization by the State? This control, however, is already ensured by the nationalization of the credit banks, which take up a key position. Their nationalization automatically places all other enterprises under State control.

The Government should, therefore, refrain from nationalizing other undertakings. It is desirable that private enterprise should be left free in its development within the bounds set by the Government. Self-interest is still man's most powerful incentive to work. It functions as a lever, and leads to ever-increasing production. The community would cause itself an infinity of harm if it removed or reduced this stimulus of self-interest.

There is still another great drawback to nationalization. According as it proceeds, private persons are increasingly denied the possibility of investing

their means in profitable concerns. This must necessarily have a very adverse effect on the people's propensity to save, which again is bound to have unfavourable repercussions on production in general. For, as we have explained above, the State itself can in the long run not grant money to be used for long-term investments without impairing the health of the nation's economic conditions, as this would only result in a continual increase in the volume of money, with the attendant drawbacks of inflation and depreciation of the national currency; for such investments the money of private persons should be attracted. In the case of complete nationalization or communism, private persons cannot but invest their money in Government securities. It is very doubtful whether there would be great inclination to do so. The people would most probably be deterred from saving and convert all their money into articles of consumption.

Still another danger lurks behind nationalization: that the Government becomes directly involved in the many difficulties caused by the labourers' demands for wage increases and those affecting other conditions. The Government as a poly-archy is not in the same degree as a private employer suited to solve these problems smoothly. Would it not, also in this case, be wise for the Government to pursue the policy of leaving this solution to the private employer and private labourers, as being the persons directly interested in their undertaking, and to be content with the rôle of mediator? Or, in the case of State exploitation, does it want a way out, as in communist Russia, by introducing compulsory labour and issuing a prohibition against striking, under threat of heavy punishment in the case of transgression? A consideration of the constraint to which the Russian labourer is subject will be sufficient to turn one against this régime.

In Holland a much better system is developing, which while leaving the enterprises their private character, tends to reconcile the mutually conflicting interests of worker, employer and consumer. I would point to the preparation of a Public Economic Boards Act, which aims at ensuring that in a certain group of undertakings the labour conditions, production, price fixing, sales and other related subjects should be settled by the three above-mentioned groups of interested persons, under the supervision of the Government for the protection of the social interests involved. These suggestions show the channels through which the economic life can be gradually guided into corporative organizations. I feel convinced that the efficient co-operation between the various interests envisaged under the foregoing scheme will ensure a free and peaceful development of the productive forces of the country.

The gist of the above argument is that the entire settlement of financial affairs should be concentrated in a single bank, the State bank. I may in this connection indicate a very effective manner in which taxes may be levied under this system. The Government should provide that in the case of each transfer of money, a certain percentage should on both sides be deducted from the sum transferred, and be credited to the Government. It might be advisable to

to preserve some graduation in fixing this percentage, in the sense that it is fixed lower according as higher amounts are transferred. Even if the percentage is kept low, which must be the intention if the monetary transactions are not to be unduly hampered, the State receipts flowing from this source will be very considerable, as the total turnover is so enormously large. The great advantage of this kind of taxation is that the relevant amounts can be easily determined and be paid as soon as they fall due. Nor can this tax be felt as unfair or unreasonable, if it is regarded as a remuneration for the service rendered by the State in that it has granted a credit to make the transaction possible.

It has been shown that just as the State bank effects the monetary transactions at home, it is advisable for it to handle the payments between its own country and others. The Government would then have to determine fixed rates of exchange between the foreign currencies and ours. While formerly these rates of exchange often showed violent fluctuations when supply and demand were given free play, they will now form a firm basis for the value ratio of the several currencies, since they are fixed by the various countries by mutual arrangement and are governed by a deliberate credit policy.

It is intended to establish a world bank, a bank of the United Nations. In America as well as in England appropriate plans have been worked out. They differ in many respects, especially as regards the sphere of action to be allocated to this bank. It seems to me that these plans are too comprehensive. Would it not be preferable to begin modestly and provide only that the world bank shall function as a clearing institute of the various States for the adjustment of their respective claims? In performing even this task the world bank would be able to render invaluable services. It would be easy to arrive at an agreement on this point. Further activities would then follow automatically.

If the plan for a State bank were executed, it might be greatly instrumental in realizing the aims laid down by the various nations in the Bretton Woods agreement.

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THE CHILD AND THE AFTERMATH OF WAR

BY JOHN A. F. WATSON

NOT long ago a class of boys in an approved school were required to write an essay. In one—its author was about fourteen—was this revealing sentence: "The world is full of people who keep on saying 'I was once a boy myself' but who never show any signs of it." At a time when the nation is perturbed about juvenile crime it is well to remember that in the appointment of magistrates to the juvenile courts an undistorted recollection of one's own childhood is a useful qualification.

What is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander, and what applies to magistrates applies scarcely less forcibly to their clerk; which being so, anyone concerned with children will read with delight a recent book, *The Juvenile Courts: their problems and their work* by F. T. Giles.* The author is a lawyer with a logical mind; as a Cornishman he has wit; as an ex-Chief Clerk of the Metropolitan Juvenile Courts the experience that entitles him to write. I may perhaps be allowed to add, as a magistrate who sat with Mr. Giles in a London juvenile court during most of the war, that he was not merely once a boy himself; he has never quite emerged from that delectable condition.

Few of us, I suppose, who take part in the work of the children's courts are wholly immune from the taunts of our friends; good humoured taunts for the most part, for the average Englishman is fond of children and has nothing cruel in his make-up. Even so, he is inclined to fear that all to-day is not as it should be. "Children should be seen and not heard", "Spare the rod and spoil the child": these were the precepts that coloured his own upbringing—and not such bad ones either. So he tells us that we are sentimental and that juvenile courts are sloppy, while the gentleman who recently declared that psychology was "all baloney" was sure, as Mr. Giles observes, of strong popular support.

But most of our critics exaggerate the size of the problem with which we are faced. They should read Mr. Giles's book. They will smile, as I did, at the story of the indignant old lady, who was asked by the author how many English children in every thousand she supposed were charged with serious crime each year. She replied without hesitation: "More than half I shouldn't wonder." It was a bad guess, for even in wartime the number per thousand

* George Allen and Unwin. 6s.

was never exceeded ten.

And yet the figures seem to suggest that something is wrong. For long before the war the number of persons found guilty by the juvenile courts each year showed a steady increase, with a sudden leap upward on two occasions—after the passing of the two great Acts of Parliament that were aimed at improving the system. The explanation of this apparent anomaly is not, as some of our critics would have it, that the principles underlying these measures were ill-conceived, but that in trying to assess the extent of juvenile delinquency the statistics of children found guilty by the courts can be gravely misleading. It is not suggested that the figures themselves are wrong. What is wrong is the assumption that the number of children who commit offences has remained proportionate to the number charged.

There was a time, Mr. Giles reminds us, "when a self-respecting policeman would no more think of making a charge against a child than a self-respecting angler would think of bringing home a minnow." And until quite recently a responsible citizen having detected a child in wrong-doing would think, not twice but several times, before taking him to the police station. A hundred years earlier there were more than two hundred offences punishable by death and in the first two decades of the nineteenth century it was no uncommon thing for children to be sent to the gallows. Can one imagine that even in those days, when such dire consequences might ensue, the average Englishman was quick to charge a child with some trivial theft? One may be sure that the great majority of juvenile delinquents were punished outside the courts with unofficial but summary justice.

But the times have changed and with them our whole attitude toward young offenders. The Probation of Offenders Act of 1907, based on the belief that the public interest is best served by reforming the law breaker, provided for hopeful cases an alternative to imprisonment. The Children Act of 1908 established juvenile courts and abolished imprisonment for children under fourteen. Finally, in 1933, the Children and Young Persons Act expressly provided that every court in dealing with a child "either in need of care or protection, or as an offender, or otherwise" shall have regard to his welfare. In the light of these reforms, and as people have gradually come to understand that to-day the purpose of the courts is not merely to punish children but to help them, it is not surprising that the public have allowed themselves year by year to charge an increasing proportion of children detected in wrong doing. And from this it follows that although the number of children found guilty by the courts as between one year and the next *may* reflect an increase in juvenile crime, the figures over a long period are entirely unreliable for this purpose.

The more that the ordinary member of the public comes to understand the purpose of the juvenile courts the more efficient they will become. It is only right that he should do so, for the moral, no less than the physical, health of

the rising generation is a matter with which every citizen should concern himself. And if in relation to children any good can be said to have resulted from the war, it is the extent to which under war conditions children have obtruded upon the public notice. Again and again, despite a shortage of newsprint, they have captured the headlines.

First, the grim business of evacuation. Looking back on those days, when the town went to the country and one half of the world discovered how the other half lived, it is pertinent to recall that the first outcry was against the schools. It was all the teachers' fault—the dirty habits, the lousy heads, the spoiled mattresses, the denuded orchards. "Look at the millions we have spent on education," people said, "and *this* is the result." Only later did they come to realize that the fault lay less in the children's schools than in their homes. What can the teacher achieve in the few hours at his disposal, when the child lives all the rest of his life in squalor? It is safe to say that the acute awareness to-day by all classes of people of the paramount need for good housing conditions is due in no small measure to the humiliating experience of evacuation.

And then came a series of incidents, all concerned with the treatment of children, which stirred the public conscience. There was the "birched boy" case at Hereford; the agitation for the setting up of a committee on homeless children; the London Remand Home Inquiry; the tragic death of Dennis O'Neill. And arising out of all these sensations we did in fact make progress. The Curtis Committee was appointed, and the machinery of the juvenile courts and the administration of remand homes were scrutinized and overhauled. Yet surely the cause of all this was something deeper than that war conditions had forced these children upon our notice. War is failure. A generation that goes to war has failed in the supreme test of its civilization. And so, amid all the carnage and destruction, one thing alone seems worth fighting for: the happiness and security of the next. It is no coincidence that those two great educational measures—The Fisher Act of 1918 and the Butler Act of 1944—were passed during world wars.

Alas, there is another side to the account. The war, as is well known, brought grist to the mill of the juvenile courts. The reason is obvious if it is conceded—a fact which is known to all who work amongst these children—that the basic cause of their troubles is not the cinema, nor lazy teachers, nor stupid magistrates, but broken and unhappy homes. Just consider for a moment all the happenings which in wartime have conspired to break up families and destroy homes. Is it any wonder that juvenile delinquency increased? And although the war may be over, in the juvenile court we have not yet finished with its evil consequences. We shall not have done so for half a generation.

Recently in London a play about a juvenile court has been drawing full houses in a west end theatre. From the genuine courts the public are ex-

cluded, but as I watched this very human play I found myself reflecting what an object lesson it would be to a great many people if, cloaked with invisibility, they could attend not the theatre, but the real thing. The case list in the juvenile court is as non-committal as the average theatre programme. A truant from school; a girl in need of care or protection; half a dozen cases of stealing; and finally a girl of seven surprisingly said by her parents to be beyond control. But as the facts of each case are unfolded, the invisible audience would find an absorbing and poignant interest, not so much in the offences, as in all the circumstances, social, economic and psychological, that have led up to them. They would also see for themselves the disastrous after-effects of war in relation to children's happiness—and consequently to their behaviour.

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The truant is taken first. Peter is thirteen and the school attendance officer has a sorry tale to tell. Last week his parents were convicted and fined for his truancy, which was held to have been largely their fault: indeed, it would have been difficult to conclude otherwise, for between September and Christmas Peter failed to go to school at all. During a later period, after these proceedings had started, he is said to have attended on seventeen out of thirty-six possible occasions.

The reason? Not for lack of shoes during all these months, as his parents allege; nor because of the catalogue of obscure diseases from which they declare he has suffered. The plain truth is that Peter *can't read*. From a quiet talk between Peter and the magistrates it transpires that his dislike of school is mainly due to this; for he is always bottom of a class of boys much younger than himself, which brings him a lot of teasing. And why can't Peter read? Because in the war he was evacuated not once, but on five occasions and to a different place each time. Sometimes he was in a foster-home, sometimes in a hostel, and all this coming and going played havoc with his education. The remedy? Not punishment, but a change of school and, if it can be managed, special coaching. And whom would you blame the most for Peter's truancy—Peter; or his parents; or the war?

Mary was picked up by the police near Waterloo station. She had been missing for a fortnight, by which time her father and mother were nearly distracted. She is nearly seventeen and might be pretty, but for the fantastic hair style, the vermilion mouth, and the eyeblack which is oozing stealthily down her cheeks. She was found with a soldier much older than herself; they were asleep together in a disused air-raid shelter where, if Mary's statement is to be believed, they had spent several nights previously. It is not the first time Mary has been in trouble, for the court is told a long story of her bad behaviour ever since she left school. Disobedience at home; lying to her

mother; losing her jobs; making undesirable friends; staying out late at night; on two previous occasions disappearing for two nights at a time. Again and again her mother has scolded her and warned her—but in vain. Why has Mary behaved like this? "She's not a bad girl," her mother assures us, "not *reely* bad, your Worships. When she was little she was ever so good, but lately I just don't know what's come over 'er."

Her mother is right. There is no vice in Mary: its just that at the most impressionable period of her life a whole set of circumstances conspired to lead her astray. Dad was away the whole of the war and for the greater part of it Mum was hard at work in the factory. And so there was little control at home; and Mary had always been weak; and jobs were to be had for the asking, and if you got fed up with your job and chucked it there were always plenty of soldiers with money to burn . . . The remedy? Perhaps a hostel, possibly a school; but first to the remand home to be medically examined for a necessary but distressing purpose. And where lies most of the fault? With Mary? Or with her parents? Or with happenings over which none of them had any control?

And now a few quite ordinary thefts. It is almost refreshing to our invisible audience, saddened by what they have just heard, to be confronted by a gang of adventurous young ruffians who have broken into a bombed house. They have stolen an extraordinary collection of oddments which are laid out, as though for auction, on the magistrates' table. Nevertheless the case is serious and, as before, the court is concerned not just with the offence, but with the background of each of the three boys who were mixed up in it.

The eldest, and clearly the leader, was in serious trouble in the same court only a few weeks ago. The magistrates know all about him and are giving him no more chances. He is sent to an approved school. But with the other two, who are brothers, it is different. Their father joined up in 1939 and was posted abroad at once. Their mother, within three months of his departure, deserted the home and went to live with another man. Before this happened the two boys had been evacuated, but they suddenly elected to return on their own and did so, to find the house empty and the front door locked. Tired, hungry, bewildered, they went round to Gran's. Gran of course took them in. She would. You have only to look at her, sitting behind them in court, to realize that. The tears chase each other down her old wrinkled face as she pleads with the magistrates for another chance: "They're such good boys at 'ome, Sir; for Gawd's sake don't 'ave 'em put away."

Beside her is her son. He has now been released from the army, but it seems his wife has left him for good. There is talk of a divorce. "Its bin 'ard on the boys," he says, "losin' their dad and their mum all at once like. O' course Gran's done 'er best, but she ain't as young as she was and they've bin a bit o' trouble to 'er from time to time. Not that I'm saying they're bad

Sir, they're good boys on the 'ole. But wot with stayin' in London all through the blitz, and their school bein' closed a lot o' the time, and all these bombed buildings around, and me only just got 'ome . . . Tell you wot it is Sir,—they 'ain't 'ad the chance they ought to 'ave 'ad. Its the war—that's wot it is Sir. If it 'adn't been for the war *none* of this wouldn't 'ave 'appened . . .” His voice begins to falter and he turns abruptly and resumes his seat.

He is right. The invisible audience has quickly divined the truth of what he says: “Its the war—that's wot it is Sir . . .” And the remedy for these children's troubles? Not surely to “have them put away”? What they need, and their father, and their Gran, is help: just the kind of help that a sympathetic but firm probation officer, who will befriend and watch over this little broken family during the next year or two, is there to give.

More cases of stealing follow. Several of the charges have arisen from no more than childish mischief. It must have been fun letting off those fireworks. The small organ pipes in the bombed church were simply asking to be made into instruments for the “swing” band. And if the Minister of Food, pontifically represented by learned Counsel, will persist in mooring his barges alongside Bermondsey wall, laden high with peanuts and unguarded, what on earth does he expect?

Even so, the more discerning members of the invisible audience will perceive from time to time something more serious than a spirit of lawlessness in these children. They will detect a certain fecklessness and want of moral standard in their parents. War does not heighten morals, and too often it is bad parents, not bad children, who make the troubles for the juvenile court.

And then we reach the last case, and perhaps the most tragic. Betty, aged seven, would be described officially as a “maladjusted child”. As such she provides a fair sample of a peculiarly distressing problem, which since the war ended has baffled the juvenile courts in increasing numbers. Outwardly there is nothing to remark about her. A shy little girl, she stands with downcast eyes alongside the chairman. Yet her mother tells an alarming story of the dreadful way she has behaved since she returned from evacuation last year. Her foster-parents were very fond of her and it seems that by arrangement they kept her with them for nearly twelve months after the other children in the village went back. But then, owing to a death in the household, they could have her no longer and said goodbye.

Betty returned to London and from that day to this, her mother tells us, she has never had a moment's peace of mind. It is not just that Betty is disobedient and untruthful. They could put up even with her tempers and her sulks. The trouble is her dirty habits. She wets her bed almost nightly and is incontinent in the day-time as well. Worse still, she “plays with herself”, a wicked practice she must have learned from those awful country children. Her mother and father have tried everything to stop her; they have scolded her and whipped her and tied her hands behind her back. But nothing seems

to do any good. And so, in desperation, they have brought her here.

The case is proved and inquiries are made, both by the probation officer and by the psychiatrist. The probation officer makes her report. This is how it reads:

The child's father was an engineer before the war. He was discharged from the Army in December, 1944—after he had been in a mental hospital for three months. He returned home in April 1945 and got a job as a labourer. He is a difficult man and was very silent and nervous when I saw him.

Mrs. K. has been doing a part-time job, but has given this up to look after the home. She seems very anxious to help Betty; at the same time she is extremely worried about her habits and is very much afraid that her two elder daughters may copy them.

When I saw Betty in the remand home she seemed to be happy and settled. I understand that her behaviour there has been completely normal and that there has been no indication of the excessive habit of masturbation reported by the mother. No complaints of her behaviour were received during evacuation, which took place when she was one year and ten months old so that when she returned her parents were more or less strangers to her. She seems fond of them, but finds the readjustment difficult, especially as the older children stayed with their mother. She is certain her mother prefers them to her "as they are always good."

Her recent conduct would seem to reflect factors in her present environment. It would be in the child's interests to remove her from home. She would do well either in an understanding foster-home or in a residential school for children of her age.

Once more, whose fault? Was it the father's fault, in that he went at once to serve his country and returned a nervous wreck? Was it the mother's, in that she heeded the official warnings and throughout the war left her youngest child safe in the hands of foster-parents whom she knew she could trust? Was it their fault, in that they came to love this child and brought her up as their own? Or was it the fault of happenings that not one of them could control?



The last case has been heard and the court adjourns. The curtain falls, but there is no applause. Sadly and thoughtfully the great invisible audience wends its way home. It has seen in the children's court the aftermath of war.

(Mr. John Watson is the Chairman of South-East London Juvenile Court and a member of the Royal Commission on Justices of the Peace.)

OPERATION VICTORY

BY MAJOR-GENERAL SIR CHARLES GWYNN

FIELD-MARSHAL MONTGOMERY and Major-General de Guingand—his chief staff officer from El Alamein to V.E. day—have, in the last month, published two books of outstanding interest and importance. The Field-Marshal's book* is a concise and clear record of the operations of the Forces under his command in Western Europe. It gives the strategic plans which governed the development of the campaign, their modification as circumstances necessitated, and the major tactical operations. It seldom, however, records the tasks set to formations smaller than divisions or comparable forces and the names of Commanders lower than those of armies are practically never given. The record therefore will chiefly be of value to military historians, professional students and others who make a serious study of the conduct of war. Yet many of those who took part in the actual fighting may be glad to learn the meaning of the tasks which they were called on to carry through. This in particular applies to the operations during the long struggle in Normandy which at the time may have seemed to many often to be purposeless failures. It is admitted that initial progress was slower than had been hoped due partly to the weather and partly to the policy adopted by the enemy, which eventually contributed to his undoing; but it is abundantly clear that there were few or no purposeless actions or complete failures. Ultimate success was the reward of steady and determined adherence to the essential features of the original governing plan as modified to exploit the great opportunities offered by Hitler's attempt to gain a decisive victory south of the Seine.

The whole book is essentially a factual record and non-controversial. Thus although we are given the alternative courses open to the Allies after the victory in Normandy, the arguments in favour and against the alternatives of a full blooded concentrated drive, or of the advance on a broad front actually adopted are fairly stated. It is not claimed that a mistake was made, although the effects on the 21st Army Group of the policy adopted are necessarily given, to explain the sequence in which its operations were carried out and the difficulties encountered. That the book achieves its purpose of giving a straight forward account of the great achievements of 21st Army Group is undoubted, but we have in the main a picture of a great and elaborate machine at work controlled by a skilled mechanic who had to deal with occasions when the load became heavy and power deficient. The performance of the machine is described clearly and is very interesting, though without the liberal supply of dia-

* *Normandy to the Baltic*, by F.M. the Viscount Montgomery of Alamein. Hutchinson. 25s.

grammatic maps provided it would be difficult to follow. Human interest however is almost exclusively confined to the exercise of control, under varying circumstances.

What were the main factors in the efficient exercise of control? Primarily, I suggest, the reliance on morale as the lubricant to ensure smooth working. Secondly, a sense of balance which avoided over-straining working parts and ensured the retention of a reserve of power, immediately available for a crucial effort or to meet an unexpected emergency. Thirdly, confidence which led to firm and determined driving and to bold unhesitating decisions. These backed by great mechanical skill are all in evidence. That the machine he was responsible for could not have achieved its results without the closest co-operation of the air machine Field-Marshal Montgomery insists and he pays high tribute to the assistance he received. Where results were disappointing the inability of air power to exercise its influence owing to unfavourable weather was generally the cause. He expresses his admiration for the fighting qualities of American troops and his professional mind was deeply impressed by the speed at which the American machine worked. Nor does he forget to acknowledge the immense debt owed to our Russian ally.

To turn now to General de Guingand's book* which is bound to have a much wider appeal. For one thing it is delightfully easy and pleasant reading and whether by design or not it provides pauses in which the reader can relax his attention to the historical narrative.

Unlike his chief he does not shun controversial subjects, and having unfortunately retired from the Army is free to comment on the actions and characteristics of individuals still actively employed. He does not however take advantage of this liberty to make personal attacks and expresses his opinions with great moderation and fairness although with a frankness which goes far to clarify many doubtful points.

General de Guingand writes only of what he had personal knowledge, either as a favourably placed observer or as an active participant, and his record covers the whole course of the war. Naturally his main theme is his great association with Field-Marshal Montgomery, first in the 8th Army and later in the 21st Army Group in Europe. He has however much of interest to tell us of earlier events such as when he was military assistant to Mr. Hore-Belisha, and later when as a member of the Middle East joint planning committee he had a close view of the Greek campaign. Later still as head of the Middle East Intelligence he had even closer connections with Field-Marshal Auchinleck in the Libyan campaign, and was in fact asked to express his opinion whether an attempt should be made to hold Tobruk after the battle of Gazala.

In common with, I think, the great majority of professional opinion from the first he considered our intervention in Greece indefensible as a military commitment; but he also holds that it was uncalled for, and equally indefens-

* *Operation Victory*, by Major-General Sir Francis de Guingand. Hodder & Stoughton. 25s.

le on political grounds because the Greeks had ceased to desire it and because the attitude of Turkey had been misunderstood. Mr. Eden's part in arriving at the final decision comes under frank criticism.

I wonder if General de Guingand is right in holding that the Greek campaign did not influence the postponement of the German attack on Russia. I agree that the land force employed in Greece was not large enough to affect the postponement: but the concentration of air force for the capture of Crete and the heavy losses of machines and highly-trained personnel suffered may well have had a more disturbing effect.

As for the earlier Libyan campaigns I find it difficult to share his view that, but for the Greek venture, Lord Wavell might have been able to reach and hold Tripoli. I cannot think that he attaches sufficient weight to the residual value of the Italians in Tripoli or to the possibility of German reinforcements reaching it before it could be effectively occupied. Rommel certainly would have been found there and the occupying force might have met greater disaster than it did when he struck. General de Guingand comments on the geographic conformation of Cyrenaica which provided a dangerous temptation, twice accepted, to thrust out into a highly vulnerable position. That Field-Marshal Montgomery resisted the temptation until he was in a position to minimize the danger is noted as an example of his sound judgment.

Before passing to Field-Marshal Auchinleck's campaigns General de Guingand pauses to compare the characteristics and qualities of the three Commanders-in-Chief under whom he served, and each of whom he greatly admired. He considers however that as a result of his immense burdens and of the disaster in Greece Lord Wavell lost some of his confidence and grip. His severest criticism is directed against the premature and abortive "Battle axe" offensive undertaken to restore the position on the Egyptian frontier. He holds that neither in conception nor execution had it any merit and the only redeeming feature was Lord Wavell's prompt decision to call it off. He gives no details but recommends its study as an example of what not to do.

Field-Marshal Auchinleck's arrival and the energy he displayed created a refreshing atmosphere and the author admires his determined handling of the 1941 offensive. He has however some frank criticism to offer. He thinks that Field-Marshal Auchinleck placed over-reliance on what he calls the "Brains Trust" procedure. That is to say that he tended to consult too many people and took too long before coming to decisions, although when taken they were clear cut and definite.

At Field-Marshal Montgomery's conferences on the other hand officers were assembled to give reports and to receive orders and there was little or no consultation or discussion. Field-Marshal Auchinleck like Field-Marshal Montgomery was determined that headquarters should not be established in the luxury of Cairo or Alexandria, but whereas the former was content to accept unnecessary discomforts and inconveniences in the desert the latter insisted on

a standard of comfort which would ensure efficient working.

The record of the 8th Army's operations under Field-Marshal Auchinleck is broken, due to the motor accident in which the author was involved when sent to meet a Russian Mission in Persia. We are however given interesting sidelights on the opening phases of the original autumn offensive and on the events from the Gazala battle to the end of the retreat to Alamein. As for the former phase the circumstances under which Field-Marshal Auchinleck selected General Ritchie to replace General Cunningham in command of the 8th Army are clearly explained. The difficulty of General Ritchie's task when, as a comparatively junior officer with no previous experience of high command, he was called to deal with a critical and intense situation was great. No doubt he received much assistance from his chief but he deserves great credit for the important victory he gained. What he and the 8th Army achieved in that phase has never been fully appreciated by the general public. Personally I felt at the time that General Ritchie's position would be made all the more difficult because, coming direct from Field-Marshal Auchinleck's staff, he would almost inevitably tend to refer too many points to his chief for decision, with consequent delays. During active offensive operations the time factor would naturally prevent the development of such a tendency but General de Guingand hints that it did show itself when defensive operations and questions of retreat had to be dealt with. He does however absolve Field-Marshal Auchinleck of undue interference with General Ritchie's liberty of action. The fact that the former was controlling only one active Army of course added to the difficulty of determining the degree of liberty he could give his subordinate Commanders. Later General Alexander was to be faced with much the same problem and to an even greater extent abstained from interference and concentrated on giving Field-Marshal Montgomery all the support he required.

We are given a pretty full description of the Battle of Gazala and the retreat into Egypt; and are left in no doubt that the Alamein line provided the only rallying position which would deny Rommel opportunities of exploiting the open desert flank with his armour. General de Guingand gives credit to the foresight which had provided defence works there and does not omit to mention the great part played by the New Zealand Division in checking the enemy's pursuit. The Mersa Matru position was indefensible but by a notable counter-attack the Division gave Rommel's advanced troops who were working round to the South of it a very "bloody nose".

In July, much against his will, the author was moved from his appointment as Director of Military Intelligence at Headquarters to be Chief General Staff Officer to the 8th Army, a step towards the establishment of one of the great partnerships which sometimes fortuitously are formed.

At that time General Auchinleck was intending to relinquish direct command of the 8th Army and return to his main Headquarters. Consulting General de Guingand about whom should be selected for the Army Command he

received this remarkable advice: "You want a new man altogether; someone who hasn't any sand in his hair. The only ones I know with the necessary qualities are Montgomery and Slim." As we know Mr. Churchill saw the necessity of an even more extensive infusion of new blood; and the unfortunate death of General Gott led to the fulfilment of this prophetic advice.

From this point onwards Field-Marshal Montgomery dominates the book and becomes a study of the man, his methods and achievement rather than a detailed narrative of events. Operations in Africa, Sicily and Italy are described fairly fully for with them the author was closely concerned. When however he later became chief on the Staff to the 21st Army Group on the western front he was less connected with tactical operations and does not attempt to describe all that occurred, dealing mainly with strategical problems and controversial questions.

All that we have heard of the amazing and immediate effect of Field-Marshal Montgomery's arrival in Egypt is more than confirmed, and although due credit is given to the influence exercised by General Alexander and to the assistance he gave his subordinate Commander we are left in no doubt that it was the originality and forcefulness of the latter's methods that revolutionized the situation.

Field-Marshal Montgomery's arrival and the steps he immediately took to get the 8th Army into his grip and to restore its confidence are given in illuminating detail. Urgent preparations to meet Rommel's imminent attack were necessary. The battle of Alam Halfa came just as they were complete and even more than El Alamein it was the turning point in the fortunes of the Western Allies. An admirably designed and executed defensive battle it finally eliminated the danger to the Middle East. This was an astounding result for the new commander to have achieved within three weeks after his arrival in unfamiliar surroundings. It is an intriguing question for speculation whether the methods he employed to assert his personality and to get a grip of his army were the result of deliberate thought or of inspiration of the moment.

The introduction of a fresh atmosphere and his technical mastery of the military situation within such a short period must rank as perhaps Field-Marshal Montgomery's most remarkable achievement if only because it was marked by so much originality of thought and action. That the change of atmosphere was felt immediately by all ranks from highest to lowest is an astonishing proof of the influence a single individual can have even when not a popular or well recognized figure. The determined resistance he offered to pressure to pass prematurely to the offensive after Alam Halfa is not the least of the debts owed him; and it proved not only his professional judgment but outstanding strength of character, although he received full support from General Alexander.

Before giving the story of El Alamein and subsequent operations General de Guingand pauses again to discuss the characteristics and qualities of his chief,

and this is perhaps the most interesting chapter of his book. It should allay many misconceptions regarding Field-Marshal Montgomery and stifle many criticisms directed against him. Placed as it is this chapter enables one to check the qualities claimed for him as revealed in the subsequent narrative. His technical accomplishments, determination, clarity of judgment and power of quick firm decision; and his even more remarkable psychological flair in his appeal to his troops and to his fellow countrymen. The cultivation of morale and confidence was the foundation on which he built. His assertion that the surest way to establish morale is to give the troops victory is no mere platitude as it might seem. It accounts for the immense care he took not to commit his troops prematurely or till everything possible had been done to ensure victory. This has given rise to the criticism that Field-Marshal Montgomery tends to be slow and over cautious but there is plenty of evidence that he was capable of rapid action and daring decisions when the situation demanded.

The appreciation is the more convincing because it does not shirk discussion of criticism and does not deny that he was capable of mistakes and could be difficult. General de Guingand has however little difficulty in showing that many criticisms were either trivial or based on misconception of his chief's motive.

Where Field-Marshal Montgomery did not adopt what might have been the best operational course of action his determination to adhere to a second best plan was better than the risks of change. Yet that he was capable of changing his method, was illustrated in the Mareth battle after the failure of the direct attack, and also in the battle of El Alamein. Adherence to the main object rather than stubborn attempts to persevere in trying to gain a specific object was well illustrated in the Caen fighting.

The account of the campaign which carried the 8th Army into Tunisia vivid as it is does not add much to our previous knowledge and requires little comment. It increases however our appreciation of the greatness of the achievement. What is surprising is to learn that while Field-Marshal Montgomery was still involved in the campaign he was called on to make preparations for the invasion of Sicily. When he was free there was little time to carry through such an elaborate task and an immense strain was placed on him and his staff. The task was made no easier by the fact that a plan had been already drawn up which he did not approve and insisted on changing. As in the case of the Normandy landing he had his way but the only trace of bitterness General de Guingand allows himself is in his comments on the mistake of delaying the selection of commanders and of presenting them with plans they had had no voice in forming. The consequent changes of plans in each case added immensely to the difficulties of the staff and inevitably resulted in delays.

The 8th Army's operations in Italy are followed only to the end of Field-Marshal Montgomery's command. Preparations for the crossing of the Straits of Messina proved to be excessive but the enemy's reaction could not have been foreseen. The rôle subsequently given to the 8th Army which involved a long

me-wasting march along the South coast is severely criticized. The author holds that an early attempt to seize Taranto and Bari, even although resources were not available to deal with a seriously opposed landing would, in view of the Italian attitude have been justified.

General de Guingand deals much less fully with the operations on the Western front. The immense labour of preparing for D-day, increased greatly by the changes in plan resulting from the belated appointment of the responsible commanders, is however instructively and fully described. There are urgent comments on the difficulty of co-ordinating air and land actions as a result of separate services and although army requirements were fully met this was often after delays and much discussion. The need for a greater integration of the services is the author's conclusion which is supported by his experience of more rapid dealings with the American organization. The gallantry and skill of our airmen is however fully acknowledged. When it comes to describing the land operations in Normandy General de Guingand is mainly concerned in rebutting American criticisms which he finds are as a rule based on half truths which may be more misleading than downright misstatements.

After the battle in Normandy General de Guingand found himself for once in variance with his chief. He supported General Eisenhower's strategy of an advance on a broad front to the Rhine. He is convinced that it would have been impracticable from distant bases, and with inadequate road and railway communications, to maintain the momentum of the full blooded concentrated thrust into Germany that Field-Marshal Montgomery advocated. In that I entirely agree with him. Moreover the effect on American susceptibilities of condemning a large part of their armies to a static rôle could not be ignored. Field-Marshal Montgomery's plan if it had failed would have had disastrous effects on Anglo-American relations. General Graham, head of Field-Marshal Montgomery's administrative staff, in a letter to *The Times* however supports his chief's views and considers that the Channel ports would have sufficed to maintain supplies. Could this, however, have been relied on when General Eisenhower came to his decision?

Interest is maintained to the end and we are left with the impression that we have received a true and faithful picture of a great partnership and of a great commander, an accomplished technician and as a leader of men a genius. That he was fortunate in many ways we may admit and not least in having a staff officer of exceptional ability, possessing understanding, tact and loyalty to the highest degree. The book is certain to be studied by budding commanders and staff officers of the future, but it is to be hoped that they will not be tempted to imitate too closely Field-Marshal Montgomery's methods, which, suggestive as they were, depended for success largely on his remarkable individuality.

EGYPT AND THE NILE VALLEY

BY L. JAMES

ALTHOUGH Egypt is situated in the north-eastern part of the African continent, its population, language, religion, culture and historical connections are more closely bound up with the neighbouring territories of the Middle East than with the continent to which it belongs in the conventional scheme of geographical classification. Yet, despite the fact that Egyptian politics are for the most part un-African in that her politicians seek the closest relations with Egypt's Arab neighbours (Cairo is the headquarters of the Arab League), Egypt is indissolubly bound to Africa by the Nile. As is well known, Egypt owes her existence to this life-giving river, and an understanding of its importance in Egyptian life is indispensable to an appreciation of Egypt's present problems.

If the Nile ceased to flow through Egypt, the economic basis of the country would at once be destroyed but the territory comprising modern Egypt would continue to be important because of the Suez Canal which turns the Mediterranean into a world highway connecting Europe and the Far East. Furthermore, Egypt lies at the cross-roads of world air transport. However, without the Nile, Egypt's importance would be something like that of a magnified Aden. Apart from the Nile valley and delta and the oases, Egypt consists of barren desert. There is a scanty rainfall on the coast—Alexandria gets eight inches of rain per year—but the remainder of the territory gets almost nothing. Egypt is not highly endowed with mineral wealth, although small quantities of petroleum, phosphate and manganese are worked, and so without the Nile water to provide irrigation, Egypt would be a desert area supporting only a small nomadic pastoral population with some primitive agriculture at scattered areas along the littoral.

Of the total area of Egypt, some 386,000 square miles, only one twenty-eighth is cultivated. Apart from the Nile valley and delta, the population lives only in the Canal zone and the oases of which the most important are Kharga, Dakhla, Siwa, Farafra and the Faiyum. The greater part of the eighteen million population gets its living directly from the land, and the fellahin constitute the largest single group. Like other peasant societies throughout the world, the problems of Egypt's agricultural workers are basically poverty, illiteracy and backwardness. Enervating diseases have an alarmingly high incidence, but they seem to have little influence on the growth of the population. The rate of increase is extremely high and the population is

growing faster than the present resources can adequately support. The extremely low standard of life is threatened with yet further depression. To prevent such a catastrophe, the only serious hope lies in increasing the agricultural production, and this means in practice extending the area under cultivation, because it will be difficult to make the land already under cultivation produce very much more, except in the case of land still being cultivated by the old basin system of irrigation. The other means of relieving population pressure, emigration and further industrialization are not likely to help. Other countries in the Middle East are under-populated, but the Egyptian peasant is extremely conservative about moving away from his home. The industrialization of Egypt has proceeded steadily from the first world war; the years of the second world war again stimulated industrial development, but there remain considerable difficulties to be overcome before Egypt can hope to absorb more than about fifteen per cent. of her occupied population in industry.

The additional food required to feed the increased numbers will have to come from Egyptian soil. Food production could be increased at the expense of non-food crops like cotton, but cotton forms the basis of Egyptian trade; any permanent diminution in the export of cotton would have serious repercussions on Egypt's trade relations. Ultimately the problem necessitates finding ways and means of extending the cultivated area, and this means better irrigation, so it is back to the Nile. It is the importance of the Nile that underlies Egypt's concern over the fate of the Sudan, and is the basic question behind the cry of 'the unity of the Nile valley' put forward with vigour and insistence on so many occasions. To many people outside Egypt, the claim that the Egyptians should take over the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan seems both extravagant and indefensible. That Egypt should claim complete independence instead of the partial independence she has experienced since 1922 contains a measure of inevitability, but the claim to the Sudan made in the name of Nile valley unity can only make one reflect upon the strange phenomenon, witnessed so often in the treaty making in eastern and central Europe after the first world war, when nations which had put forward passionate pleas for emancipation from foreign and imperial yokes frequently proceeded (once their claim had been acknowledged as right and just) to put forward claims to territories not occupied by their nationals but which they desired on grounds of strategy or economics.

Egypt's claim to exercise sovereignty over the six and a half million inhabitants of the Sudan and its million square miles of territory can scarcely be put forward on cultural or historical grounds. The Sudan is the meeting place of Hamite and Negro cultures, and the southern part has long been the home of warring tribes. The majority of the Sudanese are still primitive, pastoral and nomads. In modern times the Egyptian claim to the Sudan goes back only to 1821, when Ismail (son of Mohammed Ali, the Viceroy of Egypt under the

Turks) went on an expedition of conquest to the Sudan and succeeded (by reason of his fire-arms) in subjugating the whole territory. With this conquest began a period of misrule, involving wholesale depopulation and extensive slave trading, that lasted until the Madhi revolt of 1885 when the Egyptians were expelled.

Following Britain's intervention in Egypt in 1882, she became involved in the Sudan with the expedition sent under General Gordon to evacuate the Egyptian forces from the Madhi revolt. Gordon's death at Khartoum eventually led to an expedition being sent in 1898 under Lord Kitchener; it was a joint Anglo-Egyptian force, and its success resulted in the establishment of the Condominium in 1899. In the last decade of the nineteenth century, Egyptian nationalist feeling produced demands that the British should withdraw from Egypt, and these demands became more and more insistent and were expressed in violent terms. Egypt remained a nominal member of the Turkish empire until 1914, when a British Protectorate was declared over Egypt following Turkey's decision to join the Central powers. In the period after the first world war, disturbances broke out in Egypt, and although they were easily put down, Britain was obliged to regularize her position in the country. In 1922 Britain acknowledged the independence of Egypt, but in the eyes of many Egyptians (especially the Wafd) Britain reserved to herself too many rights and powers. The 1922 declaration was quickly followed by demands that Britain should make a similar declaration for the Sudan. This agitation culminated in the political assassination in Cairo of the Governor-General of the Sudan. After this unhappy incident, the Egyptian forces were withdrawn and replaced by the Sudan Defence Force.

Since 1924, the year of the assassination, the Egyptian share in the administration of Sudanese affairs has been comparatively small, and has formed one of the grievances of the Egyptians about the whole situation. The elaborate Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 endeavoured to make the Condominium into a reality, but the important principle was laid down that "the welfare of the Sudanese must be a primary consideration in the administration of the territory." The future status of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan has been one of the major problems in the negotiations for the revision of the 1936 Treaty. Egypt's attitude towards the Sudan is in very large part influenced by her internal problems. An increasing population gives rise to fears about the water from the Nile which gets its supplies from the East African plateau and from Ethiopia.

It is only in the present century that the full story of the Nile has been discovered, and even now there are some problems in the Nile Basin hydrography that are not completely solved. The fact that the Nile rose in summer whereas the other rivers of the Mediterranean diminished in the drought of the summer months, was a source of wonderment to the ancient world. The White Nile originates in the East African plateau region where the rainfall

abundant. The Kagera River is considered to be the headstream, but Lake Victoria is a better definition of the southern source of the Nile. From this the river flows northwards to the swampy Lake Kioga region, and then the Victoria Nile (as it is known in this area) flows westwards. After leaving the Murchison Falls it enters Lake Albert and leaves this lake as a navigable river. Despite the variations in the rainfall of the East African plateau area, the actual volume of the Nile draining this region does not vary greatly throughout the year.

From Lake Albert the Nile flows northwards through a vast alluvial plain, first in the forest zone, and further north through the savanna belt. It frequently spreads out into swamps and small lakes in which papyrus and other reeds grow; huge masses of these get detached and float down forming the sudd which impedes navigation. The river loses enormous quantities of water through evaporation and seepage as it flows through this zone. This stretch of the river is known as the Bahr-el-Jebel. At Lake No it is joined by the Bahr-el-Ghazal flowing from the west, but the actual contribution of water is very small. From this point the river becomes known as the White Nile and flows eastwards until it is joined by the Sobat which originates in the western highlands of Ethiopia. Until it reaches Khartoum, the White Nile continues to flow through an alluvial plain, but from this town it flows through a valley, narrow for the most part, over an eroded area of hard rock, and where the rock is especially hard, the six cataracts occur. These lie between Khartoum and Aswan.

At Khartoum the Blue Nile joins the main river, and lower down, the Atbara; the third main river flowing from the western Ethiopian Highlands, joins the Nile at Berber. The Sobat, the Blue Nile and the Atbara are extremely important for Egypt because they carry the monsoon rains that fall in Ethiopia during the summer months. The Blue Nile is particularly important for Egypt, for in addition to being heavily laden with silt (the greater part of Egypt's fertile soils of the valley and delta consist of the volcanic silt of Ethiopia brought by the Blue Nile) this river causes the Nile to rise in Egypt in the month of July; the level rises until it reaches its maximum at the end of September and the beginning of October. After this month the river level gets lower, and although the Blue Nile continues to flow throughout the year (unlike the Sobat and Atbara which dry up in winter) it carries little water after January. The flood waters of the Blue Nile have the effect of ponding the White Nile and the result is that when the Blue diminishes in volume, the accumulated water of the White Nile enables the Nile to continue to flow throughout the winter months, although in greatly diminished volume. By the months of April and May, over four-fifths of the Nile water in Egypt is derived from the equatorial zone, but in September, during the period of maximum flooding, the water comes mainly from the Ethiopian rivers and the equatorial zone contributes less than a seventh of the total volume.

From earliest times, the Nile floods have been of enormous importance to Egypt. The silt brought down from the Ethiopian highlands solved man's earliest problem of replenishing the soil's fertility when the principles of fertilizers and crop rotation were unknown. Man could thus cease the practice of migratory agriculture, imposed upon him because of the exhaustion of the soil, and could build up a more complex civilization than is possible for peoples forced to move their homes at frequent intervals. Control of the Nile water early necessitated some elaborate form of State control, and from predynastic times onwards, the Nile forced co-operation upon the inhabitants. From scattered tribes separated by swamps, there developed the two kingdoms of Upper and Lower Egypt (above and below the delta); the union of these two kingdoms inaugurated the period of Dynastic Egypt. The Nile was an important factor in bringing about unification because control over the flood waters necessitated co-operation and a large measure of State control.

The earliest irrigation was of the basin type—the flood waters were enclosed by earthen banks and allowed to stand until the silt was deposited and the earth thoroughly soaked. The crops were then planted in early winter, and harvested in the spring; the land was afterwards fallowed until the next flooding. This method of irrigation is still practised in the valley, over about one-sixth of Egypt's cultivated land, but over the remainder, perennial irrigation has taken its place, and is being slowly but steadily extended to the remaining sixth. Perennial irrigation involves the building of dams and storing the flood water and then gradually releasing it through an elaborate system of canals and drains.

Cultivation in Egypt is entirely dependent upon the availability of water since there is no check to plant growth in the absence of a cold season. Where perennial irrigation has made water available throughout the year, two and often three crops are harvested. The usual rotation consists of cotton (the summer crop), with wheat, beans or clover as winter alternatives. The two main disadvantages of perennial irrigation are that silt is no longer deposited on the land (most of it is poured into the Mediterranean) and so the fellahin are obliged to use more artificial fertilizers.

Apart from the increase in the crop area that will come from the conversion of the area still using basin irrigation to perennial irrigation, it is estimated that Egypt has an additional one and a quarter million acres that can be cultivated if water is made available. To obtain this additional supply of water means taking measures outside Egypt. In the past Egypt has been the largest and most populous of the Nile valley political units, but the Sudan and possibly Uganda will in the next decades be concerned about Nile water. The progress of the Sudan is closely bound up with the ability of the irrigation engineers to increase the volume of water available for agriculture. There is some anxiety in Egypt that the extension of such schemes as that now operating in the Gezira will mean a diminished flow of water to Egypt at the very

time that pressure of population demands an increased supply.

There are three main schemes under discussion for increasing the amount of Nile water reaching Egypt. The construction of a dam at the outlet of Lake Tana in Ethiopia would regulate the flow of water of the Blue Nile and so make more water available in the critical summer months. The second possibility is for a stretch of the Bahr-el-Jebel to be canalized so that the present high evaporation rate is drastically reduced. A scheme to cut a canal from a point near Jonglei to the junction of the Bahr-el-Jebel and the River Zeraf has been proposed, and this would prevent the river from stretching out into huge swamps and enable more water to reach the lower stretches of the Nile. A further scheme has been worked out for the construction of a dam at Nimule, some 150 miles below Lake Albert. The building of this dam would flood the shores of Lake Albert and the Semliki valley to the south of it. Compensation would have to be paid to both Uganda and the Belgian Congo to enable them to assist in the resettlement of the displaced persons. The Belgian Congo is involved because its frontier with Uganda runs through Lake Albert southwards along the Semliki River to Ruwenzori. When the Jebel Aulia dam was built thirty miles above Khartoum, it flooded the banks of the Nile for some distance above the dam, and Egypt paid compensation to the Sudan Government for the re-settlement of the displaced Sudanese.

The construction of the necessary dams and canals in Uganda, the Sudan or Ethiopia would involve the expenditure of enormous sums, but population pressure in Egypt makes these long-term plans urgent. Hitherto there has been little friction over the allocation of Nile water; Great Britain has exercised a general supervision over the whole Nile valley, and Egypt's right to Nile water has never been questioned. There is likely to be greater competition for Nile water as the Sudan and Uganda progress in the economic sphere, but Egypt's fears that development schemes higher up the valley might bring about a diminution of Nile water are likely to be ill-founded provided the necessary engineering work is undertaken to regulate and increase the flow of carrying water by means of one or more of the schemes just outlined.

The carrying out of these schemes requires close and continuous co-operation between all the political units of the Nile valley, but it is doubtful whether this necessitates political union between Egypt and the Sudan. The majority of the Sudanese are not in a position to judge the merits and demerits of any such union. In their mode of life the majority of Sudanese differ greatly from the Egyptians. The British case has been simply that until the majority of the Sudanese are in a position to determine their own political future, there ought to be no commitment involving them in any act of union with Egypt. Both the Sudan and Egypt are vitally concerned with the whole question of the Nile, but the Egyptian claim has a certain illogicality that does not arouse ready sympathy.

(The author writes from the Department of Geography, Farouk 1st University, Alexandria.)

PATTERN FOR GERMAN AGRICULTURE

BY HERMANN LEVY

WHEN in the last quarter of the nineteenth century cheap grain and meat from overseas began to flood the old agricultural countries most of them made a successful attempt to meet this competition by switching agriculture over to the still profitable productions, in particular dairying, high-quality meat production, poultry keeping and market-gardening. This process of adaptation was particularly to be seen in Britain, in the Scandinavian countries, in Belgium and Holland and even in the eastern and north-eastern states of the U.S.A., when farmers there began to feel the irresistible competition of their western brethren. In the German *Reich* such changes were never attempted. Vast tracts of arable lands in the east-Elbian districts were unfit for any other agricultural productions than ordinary corn growing and cattle raising. The great urban centres were too far away from these zones to serve them as markets for agricultural products other than grain or meat. Even if the big landowners and Junkers had not refrained for political and family reasons from subdividing their estates into smaller holdings, the attempt to create another agriculture would not have been successful. These lands simply were not fit for the new pattern of west-European rural economy. And so it happened that large estates did not only survive in the eastern parts of Germany but remained the predominant type of holding. But this exceptional structure could only be retained by an ever-increasing wall of protective tariffs.

It was, indeed, on such tariffs that the main economic interests of Prussian landlords were focussed; to get and increase these tariffs they were prepared to assist the interests of the heavy industries which in other respects they regarded as their economic foes because industry drew labour away from the land. When Bismarck in 1879 conceded a tariff to the iron industry he did so because he wanted industrialists to vote for the introduction of duties on foreign wheat; as long as landowners had not felt any foreign competition they had been, as Bismarck was, "free-traders" because they wished to import agricultural machinery as cheaply as possible. Agricultural tariffs thus became co-responsible for Germany's high protectionist industrial policy. To east-Elbian landlords and other big estate owners in the *Reich* Lord Byron's words might have been applicable:

For what were all these country patriots born?
To hunt and vote, and raise the price of corn?

("The Age of Bronze.")

There is one uninterrupted line leading from the beginning of protection for the land to Hitler's ascendancy. Even to those of the German Junkers who for many reasons might have disliked Naziism the temptation to secure through Hitler further assistance for east-Elbian agriculture was too strong. When the giant scheme of the *Osthilfe*—a measure of financial assistance to the land which served to put enormous sums into the Junkers' pockets—was approaching complete bankruptcy Hindenburg called Hitler to save the situation.

The German people to-day pay dearly for this agricultural policy and all its political consequences. But the price it paid for protection was heavy enough even in years of peaceful development and undestroyed cities. The tariffs had become a tax hardly comparable with anything known in commercial history. It reached the climax when in 1930 the tariff on wheat was raised to 25 R.M. per 100 kilo; this meant, if translated into English measures, a tariff of more than 50s. a quarter. At that time No. 2 Northern Manitoba wheat was quoted in Britain at 25s. a quarter. When the tariff on cereals was introduced the grotesque situation was that East-German corn could not even be used for the supply of all German markets; the distance from Königsberg to many districts in South Germany was too far to make it profitable to send grain there. In particular, in times of glut, East Prussian corn was exported to nearby countries and the difference between the home protected price and the world-market price refunded to the farmer by granting him export bounties.

It is appropriate to remember this economic situation at a moment when the re-shaping of a new *Reich* is gaining momentum. No economic aim of the Powers concerned in this matter should—apart from those relating to their security—deserve more approval than that to rid the German *Reich* once and for all of the disastrous, ever latent dangers of an impossible agricultural structure. The Junkers may by now have disappeared; the land never will. And on this land live Germans speaking the German language, feeling themselves to be conservative or socialist Germans, inclined to appreciate the land quite apart from any economic considerations. But however this may be the position is that these vast tracts can only produce corn at prices which at best are twice as much as those in countries overseas. It is of little importance to the problem that actually the cultivation of arable land in Germany was of high technical efficiency. In 1933-37 the annual yield of wheat per acre in Germany was 17.7 cwt.s., a little higher than in Britain (where it was 17.3), and almost double that of Poland or Yugoslavia. But this record "fertility", was achieved at constantly increasing costs—for the law of diminishing returns cannot be eclipsed, whatever the outlay of capital, on land already cultivated. The higher yields at higher costs were only a profitable farming proposition at ever-increasing prices.

This position cannot be altered by economic measures. It is complete folly to expect that the splitting-up of the big estates in East-Elbia will relieve the situation. On the contrary, small holding or medium-sized farms will be still

less in a position to cultivate these lands at reasonable prices than were the Junkers. The difficulty of creating economic small holdings in purely arable districts has become manifest in such parts of Britain as Norfolk or Essex; in many parts of East-Elbia these difficulties are even greater because there are no nearby large towns as a market for other products than corn or meat, provided there were an opportunity to produce these on smaller farms at reasonable cost. It should not be forgotten that for this as for other regions of Europe from the Baltic to the Aegean it holds true that "the future of peasant farming will largely depend on the extent to which peasant farmers can turn over from extensive grain growing to the production of live-stock, live-stock products, and fruit and vegetables."*

For German land east of the Elbe nationalization does not *per se* provide an economic solution. We can agree with Mr. Alexander Baykov when, writing on Russia, he cautiously says in his survey: "The nationalization of large estates, normally accompanied by their subdivision, solves only the social and political elements in the agrarian problem in countries where small peasant landownership prevails. In itself, it does nothing to prepare the ground of solving the economic problem."† The question arises whether the new *Reich* for the sake of a so-called "national" integration will continue to carry the burden of highly unprofitable lands or whether it will sacrifice the present agricultural structure of Germany by abolishing the bread tax and subject these lands to the pressure of free trade. In the latter case there would be the alternative of large tracts becoming derelict with the tillers placed elsewhere in the German economy; or else to part with these lands altogether and allow them to form their own political existence centred economically in the preservation of a peasant community, supporting itself at enormous cost as compared with prices on the world markets. There seems hardly to be a way between. The position has to be boldly faced. It would be highly dangerous to endorse Professor Röpke's view that "the ending of agrarian feudalism east of the Elbe means that the Prussian system of great estates must at last give place to peasant farms and villages,"‡ when as a matter of fact there is not the slightest chance of making such farms a paying proposition and an agrarian collectivism of the Russian type would, as Professor Röpke agrees, only be "feudalism under another name."

But there is also a genuine small holdings problem in Germany which has more chance of an economic solution. Not unlike those in Britain—although in a somewhat less distinct pattern—farms in the *Reich* decrease in size as we move from the East and North-East to the West. While in the former regions holdings over 250 acres prevail, the West and South-West is peppered with

* *Agrarian Problems from the Baltic to the Aegean*, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1944, page 61.

† *The Development of the Soviet Economic System*, 1946, p. 321. Cambridge University Press.

‡ *The German Question*, by Wilhelm Röpke. Allen & Unwin. 10s. 6d.

small holdings of under twelve acres.* This coincides with the growing density of the population in these largely industrial districts. Many of these holdings do not provide all the food requirements of the farming family; others are only just self-supporting, and still more have a good surplus to sell. Economic support is given to farming in many of these regions by the growing of vines, tobacco and hops; smaller farmers frequently assist the larger ones in harvest time. There is still much natural pasture land—as in the Black Forest or the Vosges—and the cattle in these areas supply milk with even more butter than in the best dairying areas in the coastal marshes in North Germany. Fruit and vegetable growing and poultry keeping flourished traditionally in these districts apart from the production of meat and meat-products. Of course in the more mountainous regions and the "backward" areas of Upper-Bavaria or Württemberg small farming is still carried on in a traditional way with little application of modern methods of soil cultivation; as far as meat production is concerned many of these yeomen-farmers would hardly have found it profitable to carry on if the prices of meat had not been kept high by the tariffs and by the prohibition of any chilled or frozen meat from overseas markets. But it may be noted that many of these smaller farmers have always been interested in buying feeding stuffs cheaply and for that reason they have at times voted for a more liberal commercial policy. Surrounded by a belt of urban and industrial districts they would be the first to appreciate that a high level of real wages of workers and townsmen, brought about by cheap imported grain and meat, would immediately increase their purchasing power for all those other rural products which the small and medium-size farmer is so capable of supplying.

Nearly half a million independent small farmers lost their holdings between 1933 and 1941 because Hitler, unfaithful to his promises to protect the small people, deliberately set out to destroy the small holdings, in order to drive the agrarian masses into his war factories. It is in the middle, the west and the south of Germany that any new settlement of these farmers would have good economic prospects. A small farming community could in these parts attain the prosperity enjoyed by many small farmers in Britain, Belgium, Holland or Denmark. They would not be exposed to the fate and risks of those small farmers now settled, mainly for political reasons, in the east and middle-east of Europe—on lands wholly unfit for other than arable farming and with the insufficient experience of labourers who through the dividing-up of land for political reasons have suddenly become farmers.†

A farming community in the *Reich* centred in those districts which can adapt their agriculture to the competitive strain of a free-trade policy, or one at any rate of moderate protection, must be regarded as the only possible economic

* See the pessimistic views expressed about such farmers in *The Times* of December 19, 1946, "Land Reform in Hungary", where the new small farms will have to be "reorganized" into "larger and more economic units."

† See the instructive map in R. E. Dickinson's *The Regions of German*, p. 44. Kegan Paul.

solution of the problems of German rural economy. Such a farming community would at the same time be inclined to part with the former reactionary aims of regarding agricultural income as the justification of ever-increasing burdens on the population; a community far more democratically-minded which would regard the fertility of the earth outside the *Reich* not as a menace but as a boon to the progress of the world, including that of a new *Reich*. It is through this approach that the economic contentment of German small farmers has to be sought and not from the possession of slices of land unfit for small holdings.

The sharp contrast between the structure of agriculture in the East and North-East of Germany and that of the South and the West belongs to the many economic incongruities of the former *Reich*. It is indicative of the fact that the German economy was far more a conglomeration of divergent interests than a uniform pattern. Perhaps at the present time more political attention is given to the future shape of Germany's industrial and commercial organization than to that of its agricultural occupations. But the past shows that both interests cannot be separated from one another. Britain's greatness in the second half of the nineteenth century evolved from the development of an economic policy which set an end to conflicts of a "landed interest" with the other sectors of the economic community. The economic sanity of the future Germany depends on the elimination of this conflict which has worked to the detriment of Germany no less than to that of the entire world. For the German people the time should have arrived to consider earnestly that neither frontiers nor language can guarantee the real unity of a modern nation if the economic interests inside its borders are not kept in proper economic balance. While Switzerland has always offered to the world the spectacle of a unity of nationals speaking different languages it should not be forgotten that this small country does not know divergencies of economic interests or requirements. To remove the agricultural discrepancies of the former *Reich* should be a fundamental step towards a better shaped, though geographically smaller Germany.

THE FUTURE OF THE ENGLISH COAST

BY L. RUSSELL MUIRHEAD

AMONG the more frugal-minded peoples of Europe, the wastefulness of the English has always been a source of wonder. That singular island race, as soon as it wins a victory, loses no time in flinging away the hard-earned fruits. Having acquired political and social liberty, the English appear to be willing to assume a voluntary servitude. There seems to be a political moral to be drawn from this, but that is not the purpose of this article. Rather is it intended to show how, having won the freedom of their own soil, the English are in danger of losing a priceless and irreplaceable asset out of sheer indifference, or at any rate from an apparent unwillingness to get away from parochial politics in dealing with a question of national importance.

The warning has been sounded, in a very quiet way it is true, in a recently published volume entitled *The Coastline of England and Wales*,* described by its author, Mr. J. A. Steers, as a "physiographical treatise". It is, in fact, much more than that; and, most important of all, it is the first time that the coast of the whole southern half of Great Britain has been treated as a single entity, with due attention paid to the interplay of forces affecting large areas of coast at one and the same time.

The coast of England is one of her most precious possessions with a physical and psychological value that has, up to now, never been truly estimated. Thanks to the unique climatic position and geological nature of this island, we have a coastline that can show, in a relatively limited compass, almost every variety of shore and foreshore that can be found in the Temperate Zone. Its value, therefore, as a field for scientific examination, is enormous. Politically, the fact that our coast is our frontier is of historic rather than of immediate importance; but psychologically, the existence, within easy reach of every part of England, of a territory so varied, so characteristic, and yet so continually changing as is the English seashore, should be of inestimable benefit to the citizens of the fortunate island which it girdles.

Yet what have we done with it? We have shown but poor appreciation of the priceless treasure that is our common heritage. We have disfigured it in great stretches with mean and indiscriminate building; we have befouled it elsewhere with the scars and dumps of industry; and to-day the danger threatens that large sections of those coasts which have not yet been attacked by the speculative builder or the utilitarian industrialist will be permanently barred to

* Cambridge University Press. 42s.

the public because of the demands of the Services for convenient training areas.

Mr. Steers has been accused of being completely dispassionate in his review of the coastline of England and Wales. In point of fact, he has a perfect right to be so, if he wishes, in a scientific treatise; but actually it is quite evident, from his own words, that he feels very strongly about the wastefulness that allows this great national possession to fall into the wrong hands or to be spoilt by careless stewardship. The quotation of a paragraph on the coast of North Wales is sufficient proof. "The whole length of coast from Llandudno to the Point of Air," says Mr. Steers, "is unfortunately spoiled in various ways. Natural conditions . . . are disturbed by extensive sea walls and promenades. Headlands . . . are badly disfigured by extensive quarrying. Farther east, along the dune and marshland coast, widespread and unplanned masses of huts and bungalows detract greatly from the natural landscape. Forethought and consideration for the future could very easily *have given pleasure to all the people* who visit this area, and at the same time could have kept it in a far more natural and beautiful condition."

This paragraph as a whole seems a fairly strong expression of the author's opinion as a public-spirited citizen rather than as a scientist; and the italicised passage (the italics are mine) strikes at the root of the matter. For it is a fact that the present-day treatment of the coastline tends to exclude more and more of the public from the beauty which they have a right to share. Unlimited mud has been thrown at the great landowners of the past; but in this respect they have been more generous than the owners of coastal "estates" to-day. A good proportion of seaside land is relatively worthless from the agricultural point of view, and landowners in the past have generally been very willing to allow access to the foreshore. As the larger estates have been broken up, this "sufferance" has become rarer; and in this respect no landowner is worse than a Government department—which usually means, in the present instance, a Service department.

As an old traveller, I have explored many miles of the less frequented shores of Britain—not with any scientific aim, like Mr. Steers, but merely for the sake of enjoying the ever-changing scene at the line where sea meets land. It is a harmless pleasure and one enjoyed by many. Let them enjoy it while they may, for it is a pleasure that is becoming less accessible every year—though recently there have been signs that something may be done to prevent further encroachment.

During the war, many square miles of "undeveloped" land, both coastwise and inland, were occupied by the Service departments for the training of men in the arts of war. Nobody objected then; but, as often happens, the Service departments have found these training-grounds extremely convenient, and are reluctant to abandon what they have held. Anyone who has followed the correspondence columns in *The Times* and other newspapers read by the thinking public must have been struck by the number of letters protesting against

the arbitrary action of this or that Government department in announcing its intention of using a stretch of undeveloped territory for bombing or artillery practice, or for training with live ammunition. Unhappily, the coastline is often particularly well suited to these purposes; and such areas as the south-west Pembrokeshire coast, Braunton Burrows in Devonshire, much of the Dorset coast, and Beadnell Bay in Northumberland are likely to be closed permanently to the public and irreparably damaged by high explosive or armoured fighting vehicles.

The latest word on the subject has been written by Sir Norman Birkett, as Chairman of the Standing Committee on National Parks, as a result of a rather cursory report on the subject presented by the Prime Minister in the House of Commons. Sir Norman makes the same complaint that is implicit throughout Mr. Steers's book: that the question is being dealt with piecemeal, and not as a great national issue. He speaks, of course, only of those areas, coveted by the Services, which come within the regions recommended as National Parks; and he has a Standing Committee behind him. It is the less known areas that are really most likely to be lost for ever, and it is some of these that are of the greatest interest scientifically, even if endowed with a smaller share of what is known as "picturesqueness": the marshlands, dunelands, and shingle banks. These are the regions which a scientific explorer such as Mr. Steers finds most interesting, because most changeable; and it is here that the traveller in need of rest from crowded cities can find his best recreation. It is typical of the attitude of those who would bar these regions to the public that one of their chief arguments runs something like this: "We visited the area and saw only five people in three days; therefore there will be little harm done if it is closed altogether." Soon, I suppose, there will be no coastal areas left where it is possible to see only five people in three days, and it will be necessary to visit the seaside either at a crowded resort or at a holiday camp. Such localities are excellent in their way, but they depart a considerable distance from "the natural and beautiful conditions" of the seashore (to use Mr. Steers's admirable phrase) and it is a pity that there should be no alternative.

One unpleasant, but (it is to be hoped) only temporary result of this present-day tendency to disregard the convenience of minorities is that many seaboard localities which were used for military training during the war still remain in the condition in which the troops left them, with unexploded projectiles lying about haphazard. These areas also are barred to the public, and provided with large "Danger" notices; and in many instances it would seem that no effort is being made to clear them. One of the few parts of the east coast, between London and Yarmouth, that has not yet attracted the speculative builder, remains in this condition two years after the last troops quitted it. It is an attractive stretch of heathland, of a type not common near the coast, and being accessible only by rather inferior by-roads, is not likely to be crowded even in the height of summer.

There is, it will be seen, plenty of room for a consideration, on broad national lines, of the whole question of public access to the coast. Sir Norman Birkett has proposed a Joint Select Committee based on the consideration of National Parks; such a committee might well be broadened to include within its scope the problem of the coastline as a whole; and not only from the point of view of amenity but also with an eye to its scientific importance.

Another very different aspect of the problem of the English coast is treated at length by Mr. Steers; and here again the difficulties that have arisen are due to a failure to consider the matter from a national standpoint. This problem is the problem of coastal erosion—the effect of wind and waves upon the coastline. Fortunately the trouble nowadays seldom reaches a crisis of such magnitude as in February 1938, when the sea breached the dunes at Horsey, in north-east Norfolk, during a north-westerly gale and covered nearly 7,500 acres—including 750 acres of arable land, nearly 3,500 of pasture, and 260 acres of building sites and woodland. This calamity was by far the most striking and sensational result of coastal erosion in modern times—and it has had one good result; it attracted the attention of the central authority to the magnitude of the impending threat, and grants are now being made for the express purpose of erecting defences against the sea on the Norfolk coast.

Alarming though they were, the 1938 floods were only a single instance of a process that has been going on throughout the centuries. In many seaboard counties of England and Wales there are records of villages having been swallowed up by the sea. Some, indeed, have actually disappeared within memory, such as, for instance, a large part of the village of Dunwich (once the principal port of East Anglia). On the Holderness coast of Yorkshire a whole series of towns has been lost between Bridlington and Spurn Head; in the Isle of Sheppey the church and churchyard of Warden fell into the sea in comparatively recent times; and on the north coast of Morecambe Bay there are records of severe storms between the fourteenth and sixteenth centuries, during which many villages were engulfed. These records are all authentic and can be dated; beyond them there are the fainter folk legends of Lyonesse, and the Drowned Hundred of West Wales, which appear to be based on memories handed down from neolithic times.

The one fact that is certainly known about the erosion of the English coast is that it is going on all the time; but a great deal more study is required before we can be sure how best to deal with it, or, indeed, whether it is possible to deal with it successfully at all. Up to the present, such efforts as have been made to combat the onslaughts of the sea have been of a strictly local character; and while they have often been locally beneficial, they have usually been responsible for even worse trouble farther along the coast. Mr. Steers cites the well-known example of the stabilization of the mouth of the Adur at Shoreham harbour, which, by interfering with the normal travel of material along the south coast, caused, and still causes, serious trouble at Hove and Brighton. Seaford like-

wise suffers from the regulation of the Ouse mouth at Newhaven; Lowestoft from the construction of piers at Gorleston; and so on all round the coast.

The important consideration that emerges from all this—and every true lover of England should thank Mr. Steers for bringing it out—is that the treatment of our coastline is a matter for national action. If our coasts are to serve the citizens of this country in the way they should; if they are to *give pleasure to all the people* who visit them, it is time that their supervision was placed in the hands of an authority with broad responsibilities. It is not an expensive business—unless carelessness allows another disaster like the Norfolk floods of 1938—and the returns, both in amenity value and in cash value (from the protection and recovery of agricultural land), are colossal. We have a Ministry of Town and Country Planning, and the treatment and study of the sea-shore affects both the urban and the rural population. Mr. Steers has made a report—careful, detailed, accurate, and interesting—and it only remains to translate his recommendations into action.

(The author is the editor of the Blue Guides and the Penguin Guides.)

MR. LONG

BY G. ROSTREVOR HAMILTON

O H yes, I remember the common tales about him,
His loafing and his swearing, an old salt
Who had done no good at sea, not saved a penny
Nor ever settled down : who drank his pension,
And quarrelled with his son and beat his wife.
And once I saw him myself come out of *The Doves*
Arm in arm with a sailor—Mr. Long,
Zigzagging down the dangerous road, and gulping a song.

But I was fifteen then, with a raw conceit
That I knew a thing or two. I had learnt at school
To think as others thought, and could no more see
Sharply, with eyes as clear as running water.
And so that picture fails, is half unreal;
It was the child of ten who knew and loved
And fixed each line of him beyond all change,
A rare old man, a legend intimate and strange.

Everyone called him " Mr. "—Mr. Long
Would be up and out by eleven, leaning over
The river-wall and puffing a dirty clay,
At peace with himself, it seemed, and all the world.
Under his low peaked cap, a size too large,
His jet-black eyes narrowed and glimmered as if
A gale were blowing. His wrinkled skin appeared
Brown as a winter leaf against his small white beard.

One day, on purpose, trembling as I did it,
I threw my ball quite close to where he stood,
And ran to pick it up, not looking at him.
" Morning," he piped, " that's a fine ball you've got ";
And then he fetched a sweet from his baggy pocket

And pushed it in my hand. His pinpoint eyes
Twinkled with kindness; fear was at an end,
And proud, with a purple face, I knew him for my friend.

Then, after that, we often stood together
With hardly a word between us, watching the tugs
Smoke along to Hammersmith Bridge with a train
Of lumbering barges, full of coal or timber.
But better he liked the trim white sailing-boats,
And, as the bellying canvas rose and swayed
And caught the sunlight, through half-open lips
He'd mumble, like a prayer, "I mind me o' them big ships."

Slowly, little by little, I heard his story:
A desk at Liverpool, where they made him sit—
"Worse nor at school"—and how he ran away
And soon got taken aboard a spanking ship,
The Rover, bound with steel for Valparaiso:
A full-rigged barque, "the finest you could see,
And couldn't see to-day," a high four-master
With a great spread of sail—"none, in the wide world, faster."

He told it again and again, and I would listen
Wanting to hear nothing else: but he once brought
A likeness of *The Rover* done in paint,
Grey cloud above with a yellow jag of lightning,
And inky waves in a tumble. There she rode,
Amazingly white her wings, and tall her masts,
With a slight and easy curve from bow to stern,
The swing of her line at peace—"she didn't care a darn."

"But where," I cried, "are the sailors, where are you?
I don't see one." "Oh, they be there all right,
But the picture's of the ship, and natural,
For she'd a will of her own, to save or drown us;
And some she drowned." "But how did you escape?"
He did not answer, did not seem to hear.
He had forgotten me. He turned and frowned,
And muttered again, with a distant voice, "and some she drowned."

That night I dreamed of *The Rover*, a sliding ghost
Alone and proud as a swan on the earthy Thames,
White, all white; but the row of ports on her side

Stared at me angry and black as the pitch-black eyes
 Of Mr. Long, and specks of drowning sailors
 Bobbed on the waves and sank. And Mr. Long,
 Frowning, walked the decks, and I was there
 And tried to shout "Mr. Long," but could not make him hear.

He didn't know he had frightened me. Next time
 He smiled; we didn't speak, and he left me soon,
 To potter about in the empty boats on the foreshore
 And gather bits of driftwood. I was happy,
 As though we had made it up and were better friends,
 Both of us shy: and in a week or two
 I blurted out and begged him for a tale
 Of *The Rover*, like that picture, caught in a tearing gale.

He puffed a cloud of smoke. The *Mary Blake*
 Was chugging lazily by on the oily river,
 Making a wash, and the poplars on the tow-path
 Were like green candle-flames, no wind to stir them.
 I waited breathless. Then, "all right, my son;
 I'll tell as how—I've been in a many more—
 She was took in a hurricane once around Cape Horn,
 Her masts were broke, her sails were rags, and her rigging torn.

"She'd started fair. She raced a hulking steamer,
 And had her nowhere. South and south she ran,
 A spirit in her, all her sails a-blowing.
 And then her luck changed, and a dead calm fell.
 And when the wind returned, the sun was sick
 And the mists blew up all day and the tackle moaned,
 And the gale was at her, roaring like a bull,
 A many bulls at once, and charged, and struck her full."

His voice rose high and cracked. His fingers twitched.
 He had forgotten me—was talking now
 Some words not in the book, maybe, and others
 A great sea-language, sounding of the storm:
 The whaleback, something heaving dark and round,
 The crossjacks and the hawsers and the winches,
 The royal halliards, words that made a dance—
 Nothing yet everything, the cloud-shift of romance.

But through the clouds I saw her stream and glisten—

It was my dream again, but waking real—
And plunge, and shake to free herself, and shiver,
As those bull-roaring waves struck and recoiled
And struck again. The boiling foam rushed over
And swamped the deck, and the little soaked men struggled,
And one, as the ship heeled over, lurched and fell
A shapeless huddle, washed overboard, and sank in the swell.

They shouted and could not hear. They held as they could,
Or slipped and tumbled powerless. The fight
Was left at last to the ship and the howling madman
Loose in the storm, that slashed with a knife above
And pounded below with hammers. *The Rover* strained,
But the iron gear was torn and wrenched on her deck,
And her canvas fell to a shower of tatters and flapped
And wrapped on her ropes and spars: and high, the fore mast snapped.

Then Mr. Long, the apprentice (but I saw him
Still with the fringe of white and the wrinkled skin)
Battled his way, set foot, and was wriggling up
And rocking against the sky to clear the tangle.
"The blasted wind pulled weights on me as I climbed
And clung like hell and climbed in the crazy rigging.
I cut, and the gear shot loose—a spar swung round
And knocked me flat, so I must ha' fell, like a stone to the ground.

"They sorted me out in time; I lay like dead.
And the next I knew, the storm had gone and passed,
And *The Rover* drifted slack. My left leg ached,
The same that has the limp; it's wonder I lived.
For the mate was pinned to death, and four men gone
Clean overboard, and not the first she'd done for.
There was never a finer mate nor William Jones,
As all allow, but the 'merican sharks had got his bones.

"But her—it needed more to kill that ship.
To look at her, you might ha' thought the strength
Was gutted out of her, all starved and twisted—
Her bulwarks loosened and the stanchions broken,
A scarecrow pointing up with blackened fingers
And bits o' rag. Yet there was something grand,

Aye, grand in her. Though she was done and beat,
She kept her sulky pride; she'd never own defeat.

"They brought her in, and though you'd not believe it,
When Spring came round, she hoisted and set sail
As trim and fresh as ever. Like a fool,
I went in her. Truth is, I loved that ship."
His voice dropped. There was silence. Then he grunted,
"I've told you more than either bargained for.
But take a warning, son; don't copy me,
A fool who couldn't stick his job and ran to sea."

A Dutch boat with blue funnel and low masts
Was creeping by on the tideway; in her wake
Gulls mewed and circled, as the foreign sailors
Threw titbits, idly lounging at her stern.
He followed her round the bend of the river; then,
No words for his contempt, he turned and spat.
"But if the God-damned *Rover* sailed," he swore,
"An' I had ten lives—by God, I'd 'a' done it ten times more."

THE DAUGHTERS OF SIR THOMAS MORE

BY FRANCES PAUL

OF the three houses in which Sir Thomas More is said to have watched and guided the upbringing of his daughters, it is of the household in Chelsea which most records speak. "More hath built near London," wrote Erasmus, "upon the Thames side a commodious house, neither mean nor subject to envy, yet magnificent enough; there he converseth with his family, his wife, his son, and daughter-in-law, his three daughters and their husbands, with eleven grandchildren. There is not any man so loving to his children as he; You would say there were in that place Plato's Academy; but I do the house injury in comparing it with Plato's Academy where there was only disputations of numbers and geometrical figures, and sometimes of moral virtues. I should rather call this house a school or university of Christian religion; for there is none therein but readeth or studieth the liberal sciences"

Again in the fanciful dialogue of "Il Moro", between Sir Thomas More and his guests on the source of happiness, Ellis Heywood, the son of the dramatist and a connection of the More family, wrote that they "retired after dinner into a garden, distant about two stone throws from the house, and went all together to stand upon a small green eminence, and gaze on the prospect. The place was wonderfully charming, both from the advantages of its site, for from one part almost the whole of the noble city of London was visible; and from another, the beautiful Thames, with green meadows and woody eminences all around; and also for its own beauty, for as it was crowned with an almost perpetual verdure, it had flowering shrubs, and the branches of fruit trees which grew near, interwoven in so beautiful a manner that it appeared like a living tapestry woven by Nature herself"

In such a setting, Margaret, Elizabeth, and Cecily More grew to maturity and proceeded, after marriage, in the sweet pursuit of Renaissance learning. As Sir Thomas More himself advanced in wisdom and knowledge, so his house became increasingly the seat of the hospitality which it was his delight to offer. Scholars of the humanities, ecclesiastics and statesmen, both from this country and abroad, journeyed and were welcomed there; Erasmus, Linacre, Grocyn, Holbein, Colet, William Lily, Fisher, Tunstall and Henry VIII being but a few of the names of this brilliant assemblage. But this gracious cultivation was an outer manifestation of a deep spirituality founded on the Christian faith.

In many ways the organization of this small community was monastic in origin, and the Christian virtues the acclaimed achievements to which the cul-

ture was directed. Thus in his long letter to William Gunnell, a Cambridge ecclesiastic who was at that time acting as tutor to his children, Sir Thomas More wrote that they should be trained "to put virtue in the first place, learning in the second; and in their studies to esteem most whatever may teach them piety towards God, charity to all, and modesty and Christian humility in themselves," and so, in the development of his argument, joy could be experienced through the assurance of a future life in reward of innocence, and "these", he concludes, "I consider the genuine fruits of learning."

When Sir Thomas More was at home, it was customary for the members of the family to meet in the oratory of the New Building (which lay apart from the house, and consisted also of the library, study, and the gallery) for night prayers. These were conducted by More himself, when he recited with them the psalms of the Miserere, the Te Deum and the Deus misereatur nostri; to be followed by the reading of the *Salve Regina* and Collect, and a prayer for the souls of the faithful departed. Similarly on Good Friday they would gather in the same oratory to hear a reading of the Passion, which was given usually by John Harris, the secretary, in conjunction with a few words pronounced by Sir Thomas More from time to time, as direction for meditation. In addition to these devotions, were the attendances at the family chapel in the parish church of Chelsea, to which they would travel by river.

Duties which, according to the Rev. T. E. Bridgett, were assigned peculiarly to the daughters, were the intoning at table, and the care of the sick and needy. Until her marriage, each daughter was required to take her turn in the intoning of a Scriptural passage, and the reading subsequently of a short commentary upon it, either from the writings of Nicholas of Lyra or from one of the early Christian fathers. At the conclusion of this, Sir Thomas More would open, in Latin, a short discussion upon the reading to which they would all contribute. True then to the phrase which was so favoured by this balanced company, Henry Pattinson, the family fool, was called in "to make merry." For charity, Sir Thomas More was accustomed to visit, particularly during the important Church festivals, the back lanes of his village, and to give generously to any needy case with which he met; a task, when he was not at home, which fell to his daughters, and especially to Margaret Gigs, an orphan girl and kinswoman of the Mores, who was brought up in the household as one of the daughters. The supervision of a house in Chelsea for the care of the aged and infirm, which Sir Thomas More rented and maintained at his own expense, was in his absence allotted to Margaret More.

Turning to the early years at "The Barge" by Walbrook in Bucklersbury, where Sir Thomas More first took his young wife, Jane Colt, and which witnessed the birth of his four dear children, there is but a short extract amongst his English writings to enlighten us at all of the probable happiness that was lived there. Referring to the games of small children he wrote: "Take them as little babes untaught, and give them fair words and pretty proper gear,

attles and cockbells and gay golden shoes. Such pretty plays as children be wont to play as cherry stone, marrow bone, "bokle pit," spurne-point, cobnut or quayling. As children make castles of tile-shards and then make them their pastime in the throwing down again."

When they were older, and possibly living at Crosby Hall, in Bishopsgate, where it is said Sir Thomas More moved after the untimely death of Jane Colt, and his second marriage with Dame Alice Middleton, widow of a wealthy City merchant (in thought, it is understood usually, of his little ones), he wrote some rhymes in Latin elegiac verse. As the lines, some of which are quoted, speak for themselves, the trying condition of his journey did not affect in any way his thoughts for them.

One though my letter be, it greets my four
Sweet children, wishing them all health in store.
As late I journey'd thro' the pouring rain,
My nag oft floundering on the miry plain.

How warmly you are cuddled and caressed;
What lots of cake I keep for you in store
What apples ripe, and mellow pears galore;
With many a pretty riband, which I kept
To soothe my pretties when in pain they wept.
No rod, save peacocks whisking tail, you feel,
And then the ready kiss was there to heal;

If by too great indulgence I offend,
Heaven only knows whenever I shall mend.
And you, my rosy laughing troop, repay
Your father's love as warmly as ye may.

On reading in the letter from Erasmus to Ulrich von Hutten, dated 1519, that "He (Sir Thomas More) is fond of animals of all kinds, and likes to watch their habits. All the birds in Chelsea come to him to be fed. He has a menagerie of tame beasts, a monkey, a fox, a ferret, and a weasel," it is likely that his children would have been trained in the care of some of these creatures, and in their handling. It is evident also, that the house itself, whether at Bishopsgate or Chelsea, was furnished with many fine examples of antiquity, and a number acquired on account of their curious nature. One of the treasures at Chelsea would have been the large painting of the family group by Holbein, which is thought to have been worked in tempera on a wall of one of the rooms.

As companions of their own age, in addition to their brother John, there are records of several children who, if not residing in the household, were educated with them. To the young kinswoman, Margaret Gigs, reference has been made already. She grew to be the most learned lady of her time in medicine and mathematics, and became the wife of Dr. John Clement, the distinguished physician and Cardinal Wolsey's lecturer in rhetoric. Anne Cresacre, des-

cribed later by William Roper as "a young gentlewoman in the summer," was a ward of the Crown, and heiress to Edward Cresacre, of Barnborough in Yorkshire. She became Sir Thomas More's only daughter-in-law. Alice Middleton, the beautiful and talented young step-daughter, who married secondly Sir Giles Alington; Frances Staverton, a niece of Sir Thomas More, and daughter of Richard Staverton, Attorney of the Guildhall; and finally, William Rastell, Sir Thomas More's nephew, and son of John Rastell, to become later More's printer and publisher. As the Mores and the Rastells lived near to each other in the City, it is possible that Margaret, Elizabeth and Cecily may have been taken occasionally to see some of the acting on their uncle's stage at Finsbury, and were no doubt encouraged to compose and take part in plays in their own home; a pastime of More's own boyhood.

The period in which Sir Thomas More was considering the academic aspect of his daughters' education, saw the Renaissance movement, emanating pre-eminently from Spain, towards the recognition of advanced scholarship for women; and he made the decision of offering to them this fruit of great worth. The young Catharine of Aragon, who was married at the age of sixteen to the heir of the English throne, had been schooled amidst the brilliant intellectualism of the Spanish Court at that time under the ruling of her mother, the Queen Isabella. It was here that women, although retrieving much of the piety and retirement of the medieval convent, took their cultural place with the men. Queen Catharine's influence in this country towards such accomplishment was felt throughout the Court, and particularly by those writers of the treatises on women's education. The principles of the movement were outlined by Juan Ludovicus Vives, a Spaniard engaged as tutor to the Princess Mary, in his treatise *de Institutione Feminae Christianae*, which was translated by Richard Hyrde in 1524; the same year in which Hyrde wrote his preface to Margaret Roper's translation of Erasmus's treatise on the Pater Noster, the first essay in vernacular English in favour of the higher education of women.

In writing of these principles Dr. Foster Watson states that "a combination of womanly culture and austerity was the distinct implication of Vives," and it was in accordance with these that Margaret, Elizabeth and Cecily More, with their companions, were trained. In his letter to William Gunnell, Sir Thomas More urged him to subdue vainglory, and "to warn my children to avoid the precipices of pride and haughtiness, and to walk in the pleasant meadows of modesty." To attain this end there was to be a daily reading of the New Testament, and of the writings of the early Christian fathers, such as of St. Jerome and St. Augustine: "Do you, my learned Gunnell, have the kindness to see that my daughters thoroughly learn these works of those holy men." Other practical writings on these questions, by such as Erasmus, were to be studied also. In addition to this, a scholarly knowledge of Latin and Greek was required, so that they could be used for the writing of both prose and verse, for translation, and reading, with thorough acquaintance, the classic writings of

Plato, Sophocles, Cicero, Horace, Livy, Sallust, Seneca and Boetius, the works of the latter being favoured especially in the More household. Music, both vocal and instrumental, was given no less a place of importance, each daughter, doubtless, being accomplished in the playing of several instruments, for example, the harp, the lute and the viol, as well as in the use of her voice for singing, both accompanied and unaccompanied.

But much knowledge, however, of the direction of these studies in which father and children collaborated with such happiness, such zeal, and such proficiency, is to be learned from the intimate and endearing letters which Sir Thomas More wrote to them. Beginning at the time when his absorption in Court affairs caused him great sorrow in the absence from home which it enforced, they continued throughout his public life until the months before his martyrdom; his last letters being directed almost exclusively to Margaret Roper. It is apparent also from the subject matter of these letters, that the children corresponded with him, in Latin, and wrote occasional letters as example of their work, to such distinguished personages as Erasmus, Cardinal Pole and the Bishop of Exeter.

From such personal commendations as "Elizabeth shows a gentleness and self-command in the absence of her mother . . . such conduct delights me more than all possible letters I could receive . . ." and of "Margaret's lofty character" the letters tell of the varying aspects of their training. One which is on letter-writing itself and which Stapleton records had been read so frequently that it was almost worn away, Sir Thomas More wrote to them: "Nothing can come from your workshop, however rude or unfinished, that will not give me more pleasure than the most accurate thing that another can write . . ." and then with a slight reproving, he continues: "Now I expect from each of you a letter almost every day. I will not admit excuses . . . How can a subject be wanting . . . since I am glad to hear of your studies and games, and you will please me most if, when there is nothing to write about, you write about that nothing at great length."

In others he writes of their tutors, of astronomy, and philosophy: "Though each of you is dear to me by some special title . . . no one is dearer to me by any title than each one of you by that of scholar . . . I rejoice that Mr. Drew has returned safe . . . If I did not love you so much I should be really envious of your happiness in having so many and such excellent tutors . . . I hear you are so advanced in that science (astronomy) . . . Go forward, then, in that new and admirable science by which you ascend to the stars . . ."

Again, to Margaret Roper, he wrote: "There was no reason, my most sweet child, why you should have put off writing for a day, because in your great self-distrust . . . But, indeed, my dear Margaret, your letter was so elegant and polished . . . I am, therefore, delighted to read that you have made up your mind to give yourself diligently to philosophy . . ." As though in support then of Vives's stipulation for the study of medicine (the translation by Lin-

acre of Galen's *de Sanitate Tuende* in 1517, of the *Methodus Medenali* in 1519, and other writings of the medieval school being responsible for the transition of the lady of the house towards becoming the apothecary and dispensing physician) Sir Thomas More continued in the same letter, "though I earnestly hope that you will devote the rest of your life to medical science and sacred literature, so that you may be well furnished for the whole scope of human life . . . a healthy soul in a healthy body . . ." In conclusion he infers that marriage should be no hindrance to such studies: "Farewell, my dearest child, and salute for me my most gentle son, your husband. I am extremely glad that he is following the same course of study as yourself. I am ever wont to persuade you to yield in everything to your husband; now, on the contrary, I give you full leave to strive to get before him in the knowledge of the celestial system . . . Salute your whole company . . ."

Marriage for each daughter was arranged at an early age, Margaret being only in her sixteenth year when she became the wife of William Roper. Of her two sisters, Elizabeth was married at the age of nineteen to William, son of Sir John Dauncey, and Cecily, at eighteen, to Giles, son of Sir John Heron. Vives stressed that at no time should the young girls' future place in the household be forgotten and urged, consequently, training in the domestic arts, such as weaving, cloth-making, and embroidery. There is, however, peculiar absence of any reference to such kind in the education of Sir Thomas More's daughters, and indeed, both he and Dame Alice are reputed to have had little patience for what Erasmus styles the "feminine trifles". But it is difficult to believe that embroidery, in accordance with the tradition of English culture, did not employ their fingers for many an hour, and contrary to the opinion that it would have set free the mind to roam in unwonted places, it would have afforded that quietude for reflection, so valued in the More household. Following marriage, the daughters continued to reside in their father's house, together with their husbands and their children, in the education of the latter being, no doubt, as watchful as their father had been of theirs. It is recorded that Margaret Roper, whilst staying in the house of her step-sister, Lady Alington, near Cambridge met there Roger Ascham from the University, and invited him to act as tutor to her children.

Of the three daughters, Margaret Roper is said to have been the most like her father in stature and feature, in voice, manner, intellect and wit; and she was, perhaps, his most intimate confidante. The gentleness which she called forth in his letters to her, moved Professor Chambers to make the interesting statement, and one upon which it is well worth pondering: "I fancy that More's children (especially Margaret Roper, and the foster child Margaret Gigs) did more for the Saint's education than anyone else ever did, even Erasmus or Colet."* The correspondence which passed between father and

* *The Place of St. Th. More in English Literature and History.* R. L. Chambers.

daughter during the months of imprisonment is imbued with a deep spirituality and emotional nobility, to close with the final scene on the last journey from Westminster, when she broke through the crowds to lay on his neck weeping, and crying "Oh! my father, Oh! my father." To her husband and children, and indeed, to all with whom she came in contact, she offered the same gentleness, the same graciousness, and the same wisdom.

As intellectual achievements, she translated from the Latin of Erasmus and the Greek of Eusebius, she corrected an obscure passage in St. Cyprian, and wrote a treatise of her own on the *Four Last Things* simultaneously with her father. Of her elegant and cultivated Latin prose, both Cardinal Pole and the Bishop of Exeter spoke in terms of the highest commendation. Erasmus dedicated to her his commentaries on a selection of hymns by Prudentius, and to her and her sisters he dedicated his commentary upon Ovid de Nuce. They were all renowned throughout Europe for their virtue and learning, and are said to have disputed on philosophy before Henry VIII and his Court. Their praises were sung by both Leland and Ascham.

In conclusion, perhaps, this quotation may be given from a letter of Erasmus to Margaret Roper, whom he addressed as: "The ornament of Britain." He makes reference to the sketch of the family group, which had been conveyed to him by the artist himself, Hans Holbein the Younger: "I cannot find words to express the joy I felt when Holbein's picture showed me your whole family almost as faithfully as if I had you before my eyes. Often do I form the wish that even once before my last day I may look upon that most dear society, to which I owe a great part of whatever little fortune or glory I possess; and to none could I be indebted more willingly. The painter's skill has given me no small portion of my wish. I recognize you all, but no one better than yourself. I seem to behold thro' all your beautiful household a soul shining forth still more beautiful. I congratulate you all in that family happiness, but most of all your excellent father . . ."

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CAN LABOUR GOVERN?

BY JOHN ARMITAGE

THE political events of the last few weeks, the publication of the economic White Paper, the dismal reports from abroad of the foreigner's estimate of our chances of survival and our own realization of the magnitude of our plight have all encouraged from time to time the glance backward to July 1945 when the Labour party, glorying in an unexpectedly large majority, faced the future boldly. In a new Penguin, *Labour's First Year*, Mr. J. E. D. Hall, a journalist, tells the story of the start of this high adventure.* His book is reportage without commentary and he achieves his aim of presenting the scene in Parliament with lively detachment.

In spite of the set-back the Labour Party's programme has received and the now obvious dangers into which a too zealous adherence to it has brought us, it is unlikely that the main bulk of Labour's henchmen has lost faith. There is even less likelihood that the Conservative Party have substantially gained. Local elections will give an indication of the direction of the wind but were we to suffer a General Election tomorrow it is probable that Labour's losses would not be more than fifty or sixty seats.

What may be seen, in the next twelve months and if Labour are wise, is a modification of the present programme. Truculent back-benchers stand in the way of this and to force the issue may well mean a break to the left. If so, it might be no bad thing for Labour. For this Parliament, after a stampeding start, to gain the epithet 'moderate' would be a great achievement. It stands whether people like it or not in the stream of history, half way between the extremes of America and Russia. If it can perform the miracle of holding the balance between those mighty nations and at the same time offer Britain a workable compromise, it will have served its purpose. Given peace abroad, Britain may then look forward to a period of consolidation, under one party or another, with its new course set.

Of particular interest in Mr. Hall's book is the reminder of what Mr. Herbert Morrison had to say in 1945 about the citizen and the State. This is a matter of grave concern to almost everybody at the present time and it is good to find that Mr. Morrison has not been unmindful of this problem from the start. In the debate on the King's Speech, Mr. Morrison said:

... Where necessary we shall socialize, but we are determined that both in publicly and privately owned industries efficiency must be the test and efficiency must be developed to the utmost. Where we socialize fair and proper compensation will be paid. We shall stop harmful, restrictive practices which prevent the most effective use of the country's resources.

In all this there is no real threat to civil liberty or the real freedom of the individual.

* Penguin Books. 1s.

On the contrary, the liberty and real freedom of the people have been circumscribed and shamefully limited over long years by the economic imperfections of our industrial organization and sometimes by the tyrannical use of economic power. All this development and economic change, the emergence of a nation which is for the first time the master and not the victim of its industrial resources, spell emancipation in many ways and a higher standard of liberty than they have ever enjoyed before for millions of our fellow citizens.

Preserving the freedom of the individual within the State machine is a hard aim and many are far from satisfied with the methods the Labour Party are adopting to achieve it. If you believe, said a Labour M.P. privately in defence of his party, that the measures now being introduced are so important to the welfare of the people and hence to the individuals that they brook no delay, you will not quarrel with the use of the guillotine and the prospect that some of the legislation may be inadequately considered, rendering amending legislation necessary at a later date. But Mr. Hall gives chapter and verse, of Labour's intention, before the guillotine was contemplated, to force legislation through with the minimum of delay, relying on the certainty of it passing as sufficient warrant. That is a doubtful argument and Mr. Hall does well to recall the scene when Sir Alan Herbert—possibly not without Burke and the dagger in mind—cast his private member Bills upon the floor of the House of Commons with this protest: "If I cannot present my Bills, I cast them onto the floor of the House as a monument to this interference with Parliamentary liberty and a challenge to despotic power." The intention of robbing private Members of their right to promote Bills and air matters of importance was bad enough but in many people's view the decision to carry over into peace the right to govern widely by Rules and Orders was far worse. More recently the practice of referring Bills of the highest importance to Standing Committees and not to the committee of the whole House has caused consternation and the later decision to apply the guillotine has increased the danger that Bills will be ill-considered.

No doubt the Labour Party have no evil intentions in all this. They are right no doubt to appreciate that old methods will not meet modern needs. But they must be aware that they are setting a precedent and that the day will come when they are no longer in power and a policy of speed may be used against them. The Committee work on the Transport Bill has been good and the Labour Party have shown a welcome willingness to accept amendments. Yet, 'slow and sure' has always been a good slogan for legislation. The 'slow' of to-day may be the 'fast' of yesterday, but how unwise to suggest to democracy that its voice is not being heard!

Can Labour govern? The Labour Party may reject it but this is the urgent question in everybody's mind and the pre-eminent fear of their supporters. Four or five strong men do not make a Government and Labour's ranks of administrators are painfully thin once illness or death begins to take its toll. Labour's second year, as a possible future book of Mr. Hall's may show, is not like its first. The public is now looking for results, hoping for better times, unwilling to accept excuses for bungling and incompetence at the top. There is no doubt that the public received a shock during the winter and that the Labour Government are for the first time seriously on trial with their supporters. Unpopularity for their measures was expected, incompetency in administration was not.

Great departments of State need sound day to day supervision by their Ministers. It is the gravamen of the charge against the Government that they have neglected this important aspect of their duty in favour of pursuing nationalization. It is plain that the pace must be slackened. The nation heads for disaster if the immediate demands of its body and spirit are allowed too long to languish while Ministers concern themselves with panaceas. The honeymoon is over; only hard work on bread and butter tasks will win the day.

BRETTON WOODS FOR BETTER OR WORSE, by R. G. Hawtrey. *Longmans. 7s. 6d.*

Mr. Hawtrey's latest book is in many respects a sequel to his small volume *Economic Rebirth*, published last summer and reviewed in *THE FORTNIGHTLY* of October 1946. The author's ideas about central bank and monetary policy and the trade cycle, as restated in the earlier publication, are here applied to a critical analysis of the Bretton Woods agreement on the International Monetary Fund.

The analysis is interesting to the extent that it throws light on some of the less obvious aspects of the Fund agreement. But neither the premisses on which it is based nor the conclusions at which it arrives, are convincing. The sub-title of the book makes it fairly obvious from the outset that the author's attitude to Bretton Woods is sceptical, if not altogether negative. When he states bluntly that "a country's right to alter the par value of its own currency should never be parted with" (p. 40) he goes in fact farther in his condemnation of Bretton Woods than many another critic. Logically, the full maintenance of a country's monetary, hence economic, sovereignty would exclude any hope of international agreement on even the broad outlines of world economic policy.

But Mr. Hawtrey's main criticism is not concerned with economic sovereignty. His belief in the monetary origin of the trade cycle is apparently unshaken. He holds that its fluctuations can only be levelled out by an internationally concerted credit policy. Such a credit policy requires the stabilization of the purchasing power (called wealth value by Mr. Hawtrey) of at least the main currencies, in preference to the stabilization of their exchange rates. Mr. Hawtrey's aim is an equilibrium position defined as "a state of economic activity always simmering, but never boiling over, marked by a remunerative, but approximately stable price level and full employment . . ." (p. 32). The conception of the Inter-

national Monetary Fund, however, is such, according to Mr. Hawtrey, as to render very likely the "overboiling" of economic activity, as it is weighted in favour of credit expansion. Safeguards against inflation are missing, particularly since central banks, under the influence of Keynesian economics and erroneous ideas about the bank rate, have abandoned the use of bank rate technique for credit regulation. Yet, the use of bank rate and "dear money" are necessary when inflationary trends develop in conditions of full employment.

It is no argument against Mr. Hawtrey that he stands almost alone in present-day economic literature in his defence of the monetary explanation of the trade cycle and his belief in the bank rate technique. The *consensus omnium* is no proof, as many learned to their dismay when they opposed—in times of severe unemployment—the expansionist economics preached by Keynes. Indeed, Mr. Hawtrey is no doubt right when he stresses that an inflationary credit policy, while appropriate in conditions of under-employment, is out of place when full employment has been reached.

But when all this is granted, Mr. Hawtrey's criticism of Bretton Woods seems to rest on subsidiary charges. The main charge is not brought. He has little to say about the course of United States economic policy during the inter-war years, which was undoubtedly one of the main factors in producing economic anarchy the world over. That policy consistently aimed at the maintenance of an export surplus in the balance of trade at a time when the U.S.A., having become the world's largest creditor nation, also collected a large annual income from foreign investment. Over the years 1919-39, the net surplus on both these counts totalled \$14,453 million of which only 4,600 million were offset by American credits to foreign countries. The loans stopped almost completely after 1929. The debtor countries were compelled to settle in gold \$10,800 million of the surplus. No concerted credit

policy could possibly have corrected so fundamental a disequilibrium. That disequilibrium originated from general economic policy far more than from monetary or credit policy and its chief expression was mass unemployment.

Thus, Mr. Hawtrey's statement (on p. 120) that "it is a mistake to look for any material part of the solution of the problem of general unemployment in international trade policy", while not surprising, given the premisses of his reasoning, is difficult to reconcile with recent economic experience. Mr. Hawtrey does not see the root evil of Bretton Woods, which is that it allows the United States to resume and continue its economic policy of 1919-39. All possible doubts on this point were dispelled by the publication of the American "Proposals for the consideration of an International Conference on Trade and Employment" (December 1945) and their sequel, the "Suggested Charter for an International Trade Organization" (September 1946).

R. P. SCHWARZ.

THE IDEA OF NATIONALISM,

by Hans Kohn. *Macmillan*. 36s.

ORIGINS OF OUR TIME, by Karl Polanyi. *Gollancz*. 10s. 6d.

Professor Hans Kohn is the author of nearly a dozen scholarly works on the question of nationalism. His multinational background predestines him to be one of the chief analysts of this most destructive of all contemporary passions. His present work traces the origins of the idea of nationalism from the earliest days of the Hebrews and Greeks to the outbreak of the French Revolution. The enormous amount of material, however, really amounts to a rewriting of history aimed at the understanding of the present rôle of nationalism. Whether the attempt will be successful one could hardly judge before reading the next two volumes promised as the completion of the present work. They will carry on the subject to the final phase of nationalism as one of the conditioning factors of

twentieth century history. After the first volume one is not much nearer to the understanding of nationalism though one's knowledge of historical details is considerably widened.

A more immediately satisfactory study is Professor Karl Polanyi's sparkling re-interpretation of nineteenth century economic and social history. Although the author stops at the point where interesting and topical questions could have been answered, his history of the last 150 years provides entirely novel points of departure for the analysis of possible future trends. With the combined knowledge of a historian, economist, sociologist and anthropologist but with the enthusiasm of an adolescent, Karl Polanyi enters our dusty museum of the nineteenth century. He lifts the glass-cases, re-writes the old labels, replaces them by new ones and entirely regroups the exhibits, and the result is a totally new impression of the meaning and effects of that oft-interpreted but little-understood predecessor of our century. Broadly stated, Professor Polanyi's aim is to trace the collapse of the universal market-economy, leading to its replacement by regional groupings.

The central thesis of the study is that the 'materialistic' and sober society of the nineteenth century was based on the utopia of the natural self-regulating market. This very idea caused its downfall as the concept was based on a distortion of the natural development of society and the psychological characteristics of man. The set of fictions which this system developed regarding the elements of the market: labour, land and money, could not withstand the social progress which revolted against the classification of these elements as mere commodities. Against the ravages of this system society had to protect itself and ultimately it brought about the disintegration of market economy itself.

The social, economic and psychological effects of this utopia and its downfall are analysed in Karl Polanyi's book with a brilliance that makes the book compulsory

reading to any serious student of contemporary affairs. The involved arguments and deep analysis do not make easy reading but, as a compensation, the study is beautifully written and Professor Polanyi's gift for dramatic and colourful presentation makes every page of it immensely stimulating.

TIBOR MENDE.

THE DECLINE OF LIBERALISM AS AN IDEOLOGY: With particular reference to German politico-legal thought, by John H. Hallowell. *Kegan Paul. 12s. 6d.*

The sub-title of Mr. Hallowell's book is important, for it deals almost exclusively with the decline of Liberalism as an ideology in Germany, and even so, largely with reference to the theories of jurists. His analysis of their progressive emptying from the conception of the *Rechtsstaat*, and from the concept of law itself, of everything save a formal content is very interesting, but highly specialized; and it requires a considerable knowledge of the actual political evolution of Germany during the century before the arrival of the Nazis to clothe the dry bones with the flesh and blood. Mr. Hallowell's thesis is that the idea of liberalism in Germany had been practically eviscerated by the influence of sociological positivism years before Naziism emerged: and he traces the process by a careful analysis of the degeneration of the concept of law.

In a country where the *Gelehrter* has had such an influence, and *Doctor Juris* has been the chief qualification for the higher bureaucracy, the method is relevant and rewarding. And, in general, it is true that a healthy idea of law is essential to the life of a liberal society in that the law is the symbol and the means of man's voluntary but necessary self-limitation: it is the expression of his will for an ordered society without which he cannot exist, but for a society so ordered that any element of arbitrariness is eliminated. The liberal society is a society governed by

laws which its members make for themselves in order that they shall be as free as the necessities of social existence allow.

Unfortunately, this positive idea of the liberal society as the creation of the moral will of its members, was continually overlaid by a quite different conception. This was that the liberal society was automatically created by each man pursuing his own interests: positive government, positive law, must be reduced to a minimum, to secure the maximum of free play for individual interests. This essentially negative conception of the liberal society has long been practically discarded in this country; and since it was the idea most popularly associated with liberalism, this has fallen into discredit as a political label.

The positive idea of the liberal society is in urgent need of clarification and re-statement. It needs to be shown that, on the one hand, a continual extension of positive law to meet the definite needs of society are quite essential to a true conception of the liberal society; while, on the other hand, the fundamental freedoms of the individual, which liberalism traditionally defends, need to be understood as the means by which positive law is continually moralized, and defended only for that reason. In short, liberalism needs to liberate itself finally from its old atomistic individualism, in order to become the saving philosophy of the new integrated society, which has come to stay.

This clarification of Liberalism requires a new appreciation of the all-important part played by conscience in the formation and structure of a liberal society. Mr. Hallowell says of "integral liberalism":

Conscience is the keystone of the whole structure . . . Only conscience bids the individual to follow the dictates of reason rather than those of interests. At the basis of this conception of law is conscience (theoretically, ethics) and upon the conscientiousness of individuals rests the choice between order and anarchy.

The italics are Mr. Hallowell's. For an abstract analysis of liberalism as a pure ideology the emphasis is correct; but it gives a false idea of any effective liberal

society. For the conscience which is, as Mr. Hallowell rightly says, the keystone of the whole structure, is in any practical liberal society, expressed in political institutions which, though they require for their working a common sense of responsibility, do not make the tremendous demand on the individual conscience which abstract analysis implies. Abstract analysis suggests that a liberal society must be a society of supermen, or prigs: actually, it requires only a common agreement that certain fundamental freedoms (speech, association, etc.) shall be regarded as inviolable, provided they are not exploited against these fundamental freedoms. That common agreement does, in the last resort, rest on conscience and is, in fact, a common *faith*; but for the most part the conscience on which it rests is a socialized conscience, expressed in constitutional practices which have grown up organically, and have acquired "numin-

ousness". In other words, German politico-legal theory is a distorting medium through which to view liberalism; its nature can be apprehended only in the practices of an actual liberal society.

J. MIDDLETON MURRY.

A STUDY OF HISTORY, by Arnold J. Toynbee. Abridgement of Volumes I-VI, by D. C. Somervell. *Oxford University Press.* 25s.

A distinguished professor of history was wondering in 1933, when the first three volumes of Mr. Toynbee's *A Study of History* appeared, what its effects would be on his students. Were we for a generation or so to have all history seen through Mr. Toynbee's eyes? Were his views to be the common fare of scholarship and Schools papers alike? Such anxiety was a tribute to the book's imaginative power, and it becomes even more reasonable with Mr. D. C. Somer-

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vell's masterly abridgement of the first six volumes.

The reader who would be daunted by a work so large and still unfinished can now gain a full grasp of its philosophy and argument, losing only some of the detailed historical illustrations which support them. Many more will be influenced by this fascinating study of the rise and fall of civilizations, with its somewhat sceptical appraisal of the future of our own. It is true that it lies across the main current of contemporary historical writing, which, under the example of the strict German school, is more interested in discovering what happened than why it happened. It is true, too, that Mr. Toynbee, in developing a scheme to explain the movement of history—in his theory of "challenge and response", for example, by which a growing society is driven to great works by the stimuli of hard countries, external enemies, internal troubles and so on—may be found here and there by the severer critical historian to have bent the facts to his purposes. But great works of this sort have a way of riding down their critics. Spengler's pattern hardly supports investigation—Mr. Toynbee himself points out its weakness—but Spengler had his effect on German youth before the Nazis came.

We are faced with the fact that, of the twenty-one civilizations that have been born alive and have proceeded to grow, thirteen are dead and buried; that seven of the remaining eight are apparently in decline, and that the eighth, which is our own, may have passed its zenith for all that we as yet know.

The profound attraction of the *Study*—one might almost say its glory—lies in its power of bringing the reader to consider the whole history of man and of leading the imagination to consider the great questions rising from it. Is it possible to descry in the growths and declines of human societies some directing purpose? Is there, in spite of constant setbacks, an advance in sum, and, if so, to what end? Or is the environment in which successive generations are

placed, and by whose maintenance or improvement they set such store, of little importance after all? May we say that the only matter is the victories or defeats of the human individual, and that the background against which he lives as a man and makes his choices, whether it be civilization or barbarism, is immaterial to the merciful judgment made of him, which will take into full account the circumstances of the times and of the society in which he had to act?

Questions of this sort are provoked rather than answered by this book. For the author it is enough to show the causes of decline in civilizations, and to suggest, for he is no determinist, how they might have been, and how they might be, overborne or removed. But these questions will rise all the same in the reader's mind. They are dangerous questions. Men are happy when they feel confident that their own society deserves to endure and will endure, even when they possess that notion, justly derided by Mr. Toynbee, "that there is only one river of civilization, our own, and that all others are tributary to it or else lost in the desert sands." It is not good for them, perhaps, to be reminded, at a time when they can feel themselves faltering, that they may be on a slope down which other noble societies have slid before theirs into the dark void. This way of thinking is at variance with campaigns to take the brave new world by storm and to achieve felicity through production per man-hour and export drives. But contemplative men have ever been found to love inspired variations on the theme of *sic transit gloria*.

A. W. JAMES.

CHARLES AND CROMWELL, by Hugh Ross Williamson. *Duckworth*. 15s.

A CHARACTER OF THE TRIMMER, by H. C. Foxcroft. *Cambridge University Press*. 18s.

It may be, as Dr. H. A. L. Fisher once expressed it, that the only safe rule for the writer of history is that "he should

recognize in the development of human destinies the play of the contingent and the unforeseen." This is, however, a dictum which can, like so many others, be subjected to a variety of interpretations. How much may depend on the approach and viewpoint of the author is abundantly illustrated by these two biographies.

Mr. Williamson, while subscribing wholeheartedly to this dictum, unblushingly confesses that he can "make no pretence of approaching the years 1603 to 1649 with the academic detachment of an impartial scholar." It is, therefore, not surprising to find that he is, in this study of Charles and Cromwell, primarily concerned to illustrate his view of history as the interaction of character. "It is", he writes, "the people that matter, and the principles are important only as far as they further an understanding of the people."

Despite the emphasis on the dramatic, Mr. Williamson is, on the whole, fair both to Charles and to Cromwell. Differences in the aims and characters of the two men emerge clearly. On the other hand, Mr. Williamson's desire to make the clash and the contrast—"the interaction of characters"—as vivid as possible has led him to accept irrefutable and questionable evidence as being of equal worth. For example, his acceptance of the view that Cromwell's mother was "emotionally the only woman in his life" compels him to exclude reference to the letter in which Cromwell wrote to his wife: "Thou art dearer to me than any living creature." Again, Mr. Williamson concludes his narrative with the story of Cromwell viewing the dead body of Charles and murmuring "Cruel necessity!"; but there is no indication that this is an eighteenth-century anecdote which other biographers of Cromwell have rejected as unlikely.

This method of handling historical material is not new; but the policy of deliberately omitting "all footnote citation of authorities" in historical writing can only be justified in those who regard

history as a science. The value of Miss Foxcroft's study is that, although she has adopted this policy, she writes of Halifax with detached impartiality.

In one sense, *A Character of the Trimmer* is not a new book. Miss Foxcroft's *Life and Works of the First Marquis of Halifax* was published fifty years ago. It was, to quote from the preface to the present volume, "the work of a then young and quite inexperienced writer . . . Its length, however, and a multiplicity of footnotes . . . acted as an almost complete deterrent to the general reader." This new study of Halifax is the fulfilment of the author's "long-cherished desire to produce a less ponderous biography which might arouse a wider interest in the personality and career of this great Englishman." It is, in fact, a shortened and corrected version of the original work.

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To Halifax, both as a writer and a man of action, Miss Foxcroft does ample justice. That he was a man in many respects in advance of his time, it was left to the nineteenth century to discover. He believed in compulsory education at the public cost. He advocated religious toleration. He perceived that Ireland had grievances requiring redress. His colonial policy might, if he had lived a century later, have spared us the breach with America.

Wide as was his outlook, it was in one direction restricted. In politics it was the great trends and issues which really attracted him. Although a master of Parliamentary forms, he lacked Shaftesbury's keen interest in the minutiae of departmental work. If he was, in consequence, more effective in opposition than in office, he was in all circumstances true to his belief that theoretic decisions are always dangerous—and more especially in politics. Of his tenacity in this belief, *A Character of the Trimmer* is an able, balanced and sympathetic commentary.

J. MACKAY-MURE.

HOW ENGLISH LAW WORKS.

by W. T. Wells, M.P. *Sampson Low.*
3s. 6d.

"Lord! What a shame methinks to me that in this condition and at this age I should know no better the laws of my own country." Had Pepys had a contemporary William Wells, M.P., (Barrister and ex-Solicitor) to guide him cheerfully through the maze of English Law, he would have been better armed. His highly informative little book will be invaluable to the general reader and especially to the young man (or, at this age, as Pepys would say, young woman) contemplating the perilous course of a legal career. The two chapters on the Bar and what is curiously called the 'lower branch of the profession', tell many unfamiliar details of what goes on behind the closed doors of counsel's chambers and solicitor's offices. The chapters on the characteristics of English

law and on the judicial system are also most informative, despite their necessarily limited compass. I liked the story of counsel who prosecuted a man for cutting his wife's ear and who, complaining afterwards about the acquittal of the defendant who had professed his guilt, was told by an elderly and experienced magistrate: "Young man, you must never expect a Coventry jury to come between a man and his wife."

The author belies the view that you can no more expect lawyers to reform the law, than tigers to reform the jungle. Nowadays there is in fact a very active Haldane Society of Socialist Lawyers which has several members in the House of Commons. Some of these will detect a lack of urgency in Mr. Wells's modest suggestions for reforms, in particular for dealing with a situation in which, as Mr. Wells asserts, "the present cost of litigation is in effect a denial of justice to the man with modest means."

This book, though it raises and comments upon many controversial issues (it contains, for example, a helpful chapter on the extent to which our liberties are threatened by the growth of delegated legislation and the exercise of judicial and quasi-judicial powers by Departments of State) is more descriptive than critical, although the appetite of the law reformer is whetted by a brief concluding chapter on: "What is wrong with the law?" If the remaining books in the new "Living in Britain" Series are as objective and informative as this, the first of them, they deserve success.

F. ELWYN JONES.

ADVENTUROUS LIFE, by Admiral Lord Mountevans, K.C.B., D.S.O., LL.D. *Hutchinson.* 20s.

THE BRITISH NAVIES IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR, by Admiral Sir W. M. James, G.C.B. *Longmans.* 21s.

Born in the same year, Admiral Lord Mountevans and Admiral Sir William James seem to be natural rivals. Midshipmen together, contemporary as Sub-

Lieutenants, commanding ships on the same station and reaching flag-rank at about the same time, it is no surprise that their books should appear simultaneously. And if their Commander-in-Chief on the China Station failed to decide which of their ships was the more efficient, it is not for a reviewer to place these volumes in order of merit. Nor, for that matter, are they easily compared. For, by some accident of seniority and service, Admiral Sir Edward Evans hauled down his flag for the last time in January 1939, while Sir William James—slightly his junior—was still actively employed when war began. As a result, one has written a book of reminiscence, dwelling on adventures with Scott, and exploits in 1914-18, while the other has written with authority on the wars which have just ended.

Lord Mountevans takes his readers into his confidence from the first page. "I hate idleness . . ." he begins, and by the time we reach his closing words ". . . return to happiness," we have become his friends. As for enemies (apart from idleness), he has none; nor, throughout the book, does he speak critically or unkindly of anyone with whom he served. All his comrades and helpers have been efficient, brave and loyal; and contact with him may well have made them so. Life, as he says, is too short for quarrels, and those he dislikes he contrives to forget. Partly for that reason, he writes cheerfully about a career which included, in fact, its share of misfortune. His book should be read by all interested in Antarctic exploration, by all who wish to be reminded of the *Broke's* famous action off Dover and by all who believe in the British Empire and its Navy. There can be no criticism of an author whose candour is so disarming. But while his life, as seen by him in retrospect, is one of gay adventure, it has also been one of untiring service. We must not grudge him—though we may envy—the happiness of his Norwegian home.

Admiral Sir William James has written an excellent book of a very different kind.

His task has been the difficult one of summarizing the part played by the British Navies in a war too recent to be fully understood. Much remains secret or unknown, both on the planning side and from the enemy's point of view; and the part played by the King's ships is difficult to isolate. But if these limitations be accepted, it is hard to see how the work could have been better done. Admiral James has discarded all anecdote in an effort to describe what happened. Those who have long admired his *British Navy in Adversity*—still a standard work on the period it covers—will find here again his genius for lucid exposition, especially in diagram. Until the official histories appear—and, for the general reader, long afterwards—this book is likely to hold the field.

Writing as a born staff officer, which he must always have been, Admiral James rarely lets his enthusiasm appear. All the more effective, therefore, are his passages of tribute, whether to flag officers or ratings. Of such passages, one at least must be quoted in full:

The conditions of the Second World War demanded even finer qualities in the personnel than had been demanded in earlier wars. It was a high-speed war, a war of "unforgiving seconds," and victory depended on every man in the ship performing his duty faithfully. The Battle of Matapan was over in a few minutes. The numerous coastal craft battles only lasted a few seconds. Unless every man stood firm and performed his battle task quickly and accurately when his ship was attacked by aircraft, he and his shipmates would soon be swimming for their lives. An anti-aircraft system of control costing £100,000 would at once be rendered useless if the able seaman adjusting the shell-fuse failed to do his duty quickly and accurately; a stoker who either did not know what to do or failed to act when a shell caused serious damage in his vicinity might be responsible for the loss of his ship; a tactical plan designed to bring the enemy to battle could in a moment be brought to nought if a coder, signalman or a wireless rating made one mistake. Never before has the British sailor been so highly tested, and never before has he come through the test of war with such a glowing record.

Gifted as a historian in a field where

historians are so few, Sir William James would seem destined to take the place which Admiral Richmond's death has left so tragically vacant. It is to be hoped that this is but the first of many books to come.

C. NORTHCOTE PARKINSON.

ZITO HELLAS, by C. E. Robinson.
Chapman & Hall. 12s. 6d.

THE MURDER OF HERODES,
and other Trials from the Athenian
Law-courts, by Kathleen Freeman.
Macdonald. 12s. 6d.

Zito Hellas is the story of Ancient Greece presented in a vivid and readable form. The modern citizen will find in this book not only the history of a whole civilization (and a civilization which is near enough in time and place to be understandable to him), but also a seeming parallel to present-day events.

The similarity is not so much between Venizelos and Tsaldaris as between the City States and the twentieth-century national States. Greece, as Byron and later enthusiasts have found, is not what it was, though the clear air, the hard mountains, and the treacherous sea are unchanged—and even to-day one may see an occasional Grecian nose in that Levantine land. It is true, also, that stable climatic and geographical conditions tend to produce a definite human type through the ages, no matter how considerably the human stock may change racially. The parallel to which we refer, however, is not that of Ancient and Modern Greece. The reader of *Zito Hellas* will be struck by a more momentous resemblance. He will be inclined to see Europe—or (so rapidly is space now telescoped) the world—as repeating on another plane the spectacular and suicidal rise-and-fall formerly enacted microcosmically on the shores of the Aegean. History, of course, does not repeat itself; but human nature does, and, though there are perhaps features (at present none too visible to us) in the twentieth-century crisis which ensure that the final tragedy shall not be

repeated, it is disturbing to read Mr. C. E. Robinson's account of the break-up of Ancient Greece:

The great days were over. The City State's vitality was swiftly ebbing. With one possible exception, it produced no more great leaders; and, theorists apart, this was to be an age of small men. Even the distinction between aristocrats and proletarians vanished. There were just rich and poor people, and the successful politician was the financier who could balance accounts. Democracy itself had lost its creative impulse. . . . We find a society of professionals—professional politicians, professional soldiers, professional bankers, even professional pugilists. Specialization was the order of the day. The growing complexity of technical detail demanded it, and the exigencies of the struggle for existence kept every man intent on his job. He had little leisure or interest to spare for public affairs. Politics became venal. Gold, filtering in from Persia and elsewhere, proved a potent weapon of intrigue, and charges of bribery were frequently bandied across the public platform. True patriotism was at a discount. Yet war for its own sake continued to make a sinister appeal. Its excitements were welcomed as a respite from humdrum toil. . . . So the quarrelsome City States, grouped and regrouped in bewildering combinations, still continued their futile struggle for supremacy. And, as years passed, it became ever more clear that by their suicidal competition they were sealing their doom. But, apart from the certainty that sooner or later they must succumb to some external conqueror, there were no great or clear-cut issues such as had marked the course of the preceding era, no great issues, that is, save one—the eternal antagonism between the East and the West. (p. 151).

Mr. Robinson, like the rest of us, has doubtless been reading the newspapers of our own day. Yet one cannot find that his description of the disintegration of Greek civilization is unduly influenced thereby.

The degree in which our own culture is derived from that of Ancient Greece is admirably indicated in the anthology, by Kathleen Freeman, of trials at the Athenian law-courts. Once again the unrecurrent of unchangeable human nature surges to the surface, breaking the highly-civilized patterns of law and discourse, so that we observe how wonderful and how frail is civilization.

In *The Murder of Herodes* there are photographs which effectively convey

the quality of the Greek landscape and something of the elegance of Greek art. The illustrations to *Zito Hellas*, however, are unworthy of the text and of the subject.

GEORGE PENDLE.

THE GOLDEN ASS OF APULEIUS, translated by William Adlington, with an introduction by Louis Macneice. *John Lehmann.* 8s. 6d.

The merit of Apuleius can be overpraised, but apart from including really the only classical fairy tale the importance of *The Golden Ass*—(this was not the author's title, for it was originally called the *Metamorphoses*)—lies in its contribution to so much good literature. Boccaccio has borrowed from him, and adventures both of Don Quixote and Gil Blas are taken from him, while the story of Cupid and Psyche has been retold by scores of writers, many of whose versions may justly take their place in literature.

That indecencies abound is probably sufficient reason for his exclusion from the Latin books we read at school—(Catullus could be 'expurgated' but it would be difficult to expurgate Apuleius)—but this reviewer would agree with Mr. Louis Macneice that we are thus deprived of a rare aesthetic experience. The language with its tendency to indulge in obsolete and diminutive words is difficult to describe and impossible to render in translation; the nearest English can get to it must be the style of the Elizabethans and this is well rendered in the well-known one of William Adlington here presented.

The production of the book is excellent and judging from it and this particular choice there should be a ready welcome for other titles in *The Chiltern Library*, of which this is Volume I.

J. F. BURNET.

THE FACTUAL FILM: A Report on behalf of the Arts Enquiry by P.E.P. *Oxford University Press.* 12s. 6d.

This Report deals first of all with a

survey of the progress of the documentary film before the war, from the development of a school of film-making centred round John Grierson, of the Empire Marketing Board and later of the G.P.O. So successful were the officially sponsored films that soon films were commissioned by industrial and national organizations. It tells the grim story of how the documentary group were forced to devise ways and means of distributing these films outside the commercial circuits and of the uphill fight the documentary film, which is acknowledged as being Britain's outstanding contribution to world cinema, has had to obtain distribution in the cinemas of Britain.

The second chapter records the development and expansion of the documentary movement during the war. Here we have a close study of the work of the Film Division at the Ministry of Information, and the film activities of the British Council and the Services' film organizations.

Chapters on the use of film in education, the news film and the record film are, in themselves, subjects for separate reviews. They present what exists, what is being produced in the particular category of film, the problems before its effective distribution and exhibition and, most important, how these problems may be overcome.

It is noteworthy that of four recommendations embodied in this Report, the following three have been carried out:—

- 1.—The continuance of the Film Division of the Ministry of Information, or the establishment of a National Film Office.
- 2.—The development of an educational film policy by the Ministry of Education.
- 3.—The establishment of a Film Department with UNESCO.

In the chapter on the international use of the factual film it is stated that: "It could help to provide the groundwork of factual knowledge fundamental to any international understanding. In addition to enlarging national outlooks, it could supplement national resources by making more generally available the commercial

films of each film-producing country."

It is superfluous to emphasize the important rôle films can play in furthering these aims. How simple seems the machinery by which they can be realized. Three conditions are necessary, and these are: "on the interest shown by educationists and the provision of adequate training facilities in the use of films and visual aids generally; on the number of projectors installed in schools and other places where people meet to learn or to discuss; and on the initiative shown by the Government, by the universities and other interested bodies in sponsoring the production of suitable films and thereby making financially possible the existence of specialized educational film-making units." In this way, it is pointed out, it would make financially feasible the existence and expansion of specialized educational film units.

This Report is a focus for all who wish to see clearly the potential of the cinema.

MAX WOOD.

THE MATTERHORN, by Guido Rey. Translated from the Italian by J. E. C. Eaton. Revised and two additional Chapters by R. L. G. Irving. Basil Blackwell. 15s.

Mountaineering to the uninitiated, even to the sceptic, is so obviously much more than just climbing mountains whatever be the hazards, that a bare record of climbers' struggles, a matter of fact account of ridges won or peaks conquered will seem inadequate except to the professional alpinist who can supply the romance for himself. In this welcome reprint of Guido Rey's classic on one mountain, the Matterhorn,—which is supplemented by a factual twentieth century history of the peak by R. L. G. Irving—we shall find the very *sensation* of mountains, for as his friend de Amicis wrote in the preface: "In this feeling for the mountain Guido Rey lays his whole soul bare."

The Matterhorn then is a passionately emotional book in one aspect, often

lyrical, and using the devices of metaphor and rhetoric to help the Italian to express the well nigh inexpressible. To convey a stern and famous contest between the Matterhorn's enormous strength and a man's iron will he writes: "Now Edward Whymper came upon the scene. Into the bullring, under the burning sun, before thousands of eager spectators, the *espada* steps forth eager and brave; the eyes of all are fixed on him. The arena is now empty; the bull alone awaits him in the centre of the circus, motionless, with horns erect. The struggle is to be terrible, unceasing, full of daring stratagems; one of the two must fall. The *espada* scans the monster and strides up to him with resolute gait. Now is the critical moment. In the same way Whymper appeared in the majestic amphitheatre of mountains . . ."

In Rey's epic chapter describing his attempt on the Furggen ridge, there is more of this anthropomorphism: "The warm sun was kissing the cold rock, and what little water there was burst its slender bonds of ice and melted with secret gurglings. This was the mountain's first joyous cry as it awoke." Nevertheless, here is some magnificent writing, and the reader is compelled to feel both the beauty and sheer terror as he hangs suspended with Rey over the precipice. There is a notable description elsewhere of the crows of the Matterhorn, "well disposed to the few men who climb the mountain," which I think must be choughs.

In a world where all is restlessness, confusion and change, to read such a book and to brood upon the photographs with imagination must have a calming effect. Here, for the adventurous young is a noble substitute for the excitement of war. Something lasting in the midst of flux. For the Matterhorn is practically eternal; although its "destruction goes slowly on, it is so huge that thousands of years will be required to change its general appearance and to spoil the beauty of its form . . . the daring, un-

paralleled creation of a superhuman architect."

JOSEPH BRADDOCK.

THE TRAVELLER, by Walter de la Mare. *Faber & Faber.* 7s. 6d.

POEMS OF DEDICATION, by Stephen Spender. *Faber & Faber.* 7s. 6d.

POEMS OF DELIVERANCE, by A. L. Rowse. *Faber & Faber.* 7s. 6d.

It is difficult to review the work of those writers whom my bookseller's catalogue describes as "esteemed authors", in isolation from their earlier books. Indeed, it seems fair to relate the work under examination to its predecessors as providing reader and critic with mutually acceptable terms of reference.

Mr. de la Mare's first book of verse appeared forty-five years ago and he has long since become a firmly accepted poet. Yet his steady output has given constant proof that he has rejected all thought of remaining static, however comfortably, on the level of that original acceptance. It is not surprising that his technique has developed to its present high level nor that his judgment should have matured so richly. But his mind also has pressed on unrestingly, moving through planes as well as distance. *The Traveller* records its ultimate published reach. Many highly reputed minds have stopped short, at least in articulation, of these regions.

(But) in that secret craving of the soul
For what no name has; flower of hidden stem:—

The unreturned of kindless land and sea;
Venturers, voyagers, dreamers, seers—ay,
them
The Angel of Failure hails with rhapsody.

Quotation does less than justice to this long poem, which is triumphantly a unity. On the level of narrative it absorbs the reader into its atmosphere and draws him on in fear and suspense without respite to the end. As allegory it remains to goad the brain through the doorway of the soul.

Mr. John Piper has turned away from

his better-known and more fashionable manner to illustrate *The Traveller* with drawings which capture the quality of the narrative and show unmistakable sympathy with the poet.

Mr. Stephen Spender's *Poems of Dedication* lack the exciting images of Mr. Spender of the early 'thirties. The sincerity of the specifically dedicatory poems to the late Margaret Spender may not be doubted, but their simplicity is a two-edged weapon which sometimes cuts the poet with the edge of cliché. In the remaining poems Mr. Spender's meticulous technique and sound critical sense steer him safely into a harbour beyond reasonable dissatisfaction by a course which is pleasant and well-mapped but which does not, as of old, leave high memory. Lacking the touchstone of the poet's earlier work I should have quoted with approval. His self-created standards rob him of credit.

Poems of a Decade and *Poems Chiefly Cornish*, by Mr. Rowse, were books of carefully worked poetry. They had both gentleness and strength, and their character was warmly liberal. In this book the war poems are reflective of strictly personal loss and anxiety rather than of compassion: deeper reflection and greater care would have heightened many of them above prose-level. The later poems, which the author indicates as autobiographical, include *Pain Receding*, an impressive poem, and as fine as anything Mr. Rowse has ever written. This section also contains 'Les Horreurs', a querulous piece of writing which is the reverse of liberal in its conception. Mr. Rowse does credit neither to himself, nor to the words "Poems" and "Deliverance" of his title, by including it in his book.

JOHN ARLOTT.

CORNWALL

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BOOKS ON THE TABLE

THE advent of Cecil Roberts's *AND SO TO AMERICA* (Hodder & Stoughton. 15s.) coincided with this reader's application for a passport renewal, and the one caused the addition of "and America" to the other. Not that this very long book could not be improved by a cut of about a third—wealthy hostesses would surely have lessened even de Guérin's delight in his "stream of travel" and there are far too many in Mr. Roberts's. Also, like most war exiles, he is too prone to distil a rich melancholy from his contemplation of the sufferings of bomb-scarred Britain 3,000 miles away, which to dwellers on this side of the Atlantic is irritating.

Making America

Nevertheless, too often encouraged as we are to think of America as a raucous upstart with cash and sex for twin gods, Mr. Roberts reminds us sharply that she is no less built of history than the rest of the world. We remember that the graces of culture and tradition, as well as raw pioneering, have helped to make the palimpsest glow: our early dreams, overlaid by present-day manifestations, are re-captured—of old cities influenced by France and Spain, of spaces which really are wide open and of a people who have grown sturdily out of the mixture. Instead of scolding the author for failing to supply an index to his 506 pages perhaps we should congratulate him on the cunning which thus ensured that every one would be read.

Between the wars

The nostalgia is all on Evelyn Waugh's side in *WHEN THE GOING WAS GOOD* (Duckworth. 15s.) which contains, he says, "all that I wish to preserve of the four travel books I wrote between the years 1929 and 1935." In appreciating the good fortune that enabled him to travel continuously during that period he is surely unduly gloomy when he declares that "there is no room for tourists in a

world of 'displaced persons'." As in his novels, he shows a flicker of contempt for the masses which makes one think uncomfortably of the responsibility of all of us, including Mr. Waugh, who were young between the wars.

A way to cheer up

But it is something to have discovered that while despising the herd is a pleasurable pastime for ourselves it is not a pretty activity in other people; pessimism, too, has become a bore. So perhaps the Evelyn Waugh, and all of us who consider ourselves aloof, ought now to think about making the world fit not only for privileged travellers but for displaced persons too. The 'realism' apart, however, Mr. Waugh has winnowed the fruit of his past labours into a model travel book, and the highlights of Abyssinia, the Middle East, Brazil, Zanzibar or the Belgian Congo could not be reflected in a brighter mirror.

Kingdoms of the mind

And now to enter for a paragraph's space the less complicated world of music and the theatre. *PENGUIN MUSIC MAGAZINE* (1s.), says Ralph Hill's foreword, is designed to appeal to amateurs, including and especially those who play only the gramophone. That it makes on the whole a satisfactory symposium of the trends of musical thought and accomplishment is the opinion of one who was interested enough to read it at a sitting. Items in the contents list, such as "The Future of Opera in England" by E. J. Dent, Edward Lockspeiser's "Anglo-French Relations", "Soviet Music in Wartime" by Alan Bush and the diaries of concerts in Scotland, Liverpool, Manchester and Birmingham, give some idea of the ground covered.—Another useful little publication is *THEATRE BETWEEN WARS* by Rex Pogson (*Triangle Press*. 2s. 6d.), the first of a series to provide what the author calls "non-specialist information on the contempor-

ary theatre in this country." This, also read at a sitting, left the impression that too much had been crowded into too little space. The reverse would of course have been much harder to bear, and the author indicates that the spilled-over riches will be given more detailed treatment in subsequent Drama Study Books. As a kind of dictionary of fashions, of sorts of plays, of playwrights old and new, and of foreign plays and their writers, this one stands well the test of being "turned up".

Art, religion and freedom

The author of *Samson Agonistes*, "nearer to Greek tragedy than any other great work in the English language," is the subject of F. E. Hutchinson's volume in the Teach Yourself History Library (Hodder & Stoughton. 5s.). MILTON AND THE ENGLISH MIND, while being a new 'life' seeks also to show Milton as the representative Englishman defending civil, political and religious liberty. As poet, patriot and pamphleteer his career and influence on social and religious thought are traced. Mr. Hutchinson has indeed "opened up a significant historical theme" but no biographer has yet been able to make us love the man.—Milton figures too in Alec Robertson's CONTRASTS (S.C.M. Press. 6s.) along with Shakespeare. The aim of the book is to place the arts in juxtaposition with religion to prove that "all great art is basically religious." Those who cannot altogether agree with this thesis will still find stimulation in the contrasting of Keats and Maritain, Bach and Handel, Housman and Hopkins, El Greco, Blake and Van Gogh. And those who have been refreshed with wonder at the texture of the fabrics in El Greco's pictures at the Spanish Exhibition now in the National Gallery, London, will find the last chapter, even though it does not deal with this aspect of the painter's technical genius, particularly apposite.

Inherent ideality

Canon L. J. Baggott in JESU, JOY OF

MAN'S DESIRING (Longmans. 6s.) is concerned only to cure the heartache of modern man and to lift him out of despair. This book is a devotional study of penitence, faith, suffering, love, prayer and sacrament as ways through which men may reach and find the Son of God. The author does not feel that the present disturbed beliefs are wholly evil: "True faith is not simply a gift, it is also a task," and the times in which we live are setting that task. He is hopeful that man's capacity for religion is still strong enough to carry him to God because: "He that hath seen me, hath seen the Father."

Unpredictable being

A tribute to an earthly father, THE MAN IN OUR LIVES by John Guthrie (Nelson. 6s.), is all the more effective for its lack of panegyric. In fact, the picture begins to show a self-satisfied, orderly and unimaginative bank manager who gradually takes on a wayward personality that makes him chop down trees though later learning to love them standing, exhibit "glorious rages" followed by the hilarities of the Kangaroo Dance, and give vent to the Animal Noises which signified unfavourable conclusions in private. In short, a somewhat tiresome person makes his departure at the end of the book with heartrending consequences to the reader, who by then is feeling the full desolation of: "It was the first time father had been anywhere without a return ticket." This natural transition, that is, without loss of characterization, is clever of the author, who uses a dry and delicate wit to draw his portraits. Hitherto unknown to me, his method is so successful that his other books are being sought in the hope that they too possess this especial brand of humour.

Selected and collected

Two books of verse now call for attention—the one, slimly built, modestly calling itself "a selection of poems", the other, thick and large, announcing "The

Collected Poetical Works, Volume 1." The first is *CROSSING THE LINE* by "a new poet", Edward Lowbury (*Hutchinson*. 6s.) and the second is by Donald Cowie, "a major figure", (*Tantivy Press*. 10s. 6d.). The publisher is content to state that Mr. Lowbury has "considerable promise" and "something definite to say". Much of his work is tentative—as though he were still exploring not only his medium but the roads along which his thoughts have run. His verse is full of questions and typifies the current bewilderment:

How much of what I cling to will remain?
What is the future given
By the past—pleasure or pain, or even
Present pleasure turned to remembered pain,
Or vice versa?

The word "selection" in the subtitle suggests that Mr. Lowbury has rejected much—a hopeful sign in a young poet.

Mr. Cowie's publisher explains that the present edition "aims to bring together in one place all those poems which, so widely published during the past few years, have created an interest in Donald Cowie not accorded to any poet for several generations." This is a large claim, probably based on the sheer output; the industry of Mr. Cowie is entirely to be admired. He obviously believes in himself, has nothing tentative in his verse and feels no need for rejection. He has the observant eye and his images, often startlingly apt, are sometimes bizarre:

The unattended bicycle of fear
Against my reason's shallow, curbside lip
In sudden clatter and despairing slip
Has smacked the pavement of another year;

Thirteen stories

Another author for whom it is claimed that "he has made his own careful—indeed, fastidious—selection" is Sean O'Faolain. One sees no reason to quarrel with this verdict in his new

volume of short stories, *TERESA* (*Cape*. 7s. 6d.). There is little to choose between them in their delicate play on satire and sensibility, the special recipe of the Irish storyteller, which is only another way of indicating the intelligence that went to their making. "The Silence of the Valley", "Shades of the Prison House" and "The Trout" balance each other very satisfactorily, with the rhythm to be heard in Irish speech conveyed here most beguilingly.

Bitter sweet

There seems to be a mild epidemic of novel titles containing the word 'sweet' which might convert the would-be into the would-not-be reader. The must-be reviewer gets the pleasant surprise of course but still feels peevish at having to urge the merits of anything but a saccharine trifle in face of contradiction. Such a book was noticed on this page in the February issue of *THE FORTNIGHTLY* and now comes *SWEET CONFUSION* by Norman Denny (*John Lane*. 9s. 6d.). The connotation of the second word is clear enough; there is the confusion of 1938, the confusion of bigamy and astrology in the life of Mr. Pinsett, Charles Ellistone's wealthy business man's confusion in the face of trade obstacles, and, above all, the confusion of Paul Merriam as the publisher with ideals in a "hard-headed" family. Every one of the many characters in this book is an individual with his or her own set of standards and problems and consequently the over-all effect is consistently good. Mr. Denny leaves the way open for a sequel which it is to be hoped he will write without delay.

There is something very like a renaissance going on at the moment in the production of novels; is it the dead hand of war that has been to blame for so many bad ones in the last decade?

GRACE BANYARD.

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